« Portrait | Interview Highlights

Interview with Dimitri Diliani

Can we start by introducing yourself?

My name is Dimitri Diliani. I was born and raised in Jerusalem.1 During the first intifada2 my parents forced me to go to America to study. I didn’t want to go, but they made me go against my will in order to keep me away from what they considered to be "trouble." I got my BA and my MBA, and then returned home. I had been involved in activism before I went to America and I continued to be active while I was there. When I came back home I began working at the Jerusalem Open University.3 After two years, Dr. Sari Nusseibeh4 asked me to be the manager of his office. I left my position at the Institute for Modern Media5 and came to Dr. Sari’s office.

I am taking this year off from the university so that I can focus on the Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy. I’m one of the founders of the campaign. Of course Dr. Sari started the campaign. But as his assistant, I have been with him from the beginning. Dr. Sari likes to consult with many people, and I really believed in the idea from the start. I was a member of the founding committee, and we helped him with the process of getting the campaign off the ground. At the campaign’s second conference, held on August 21st 2004, I was elected to be a member of the first Executive Council. Building on the recommendation of Dr. Sari and with the approval of the other members of the Council, I was then asked to serve as the manager of the campaign’s Technical Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

What did you study in university?


I got a BA in Biochemistry at Upsala College and an MBA in Finance from Fairleigh Dickenson University in New Jersey.

You said you were active before and while you were in the United States. In what way were you active?

When I was fourteen years old I joined a political organization called the Palestinian Communist Party, which later became the People’s Party.6 But when I went to America I started to see things differently. I began to see the shortcomings of Marxism and the limits of its applicability to our situation. Beyond that, I myself didn’t want to dedicate myself to working for the goals of Marxism. The only reason I had joined the party in the first place was that it was the only party at that time that called for popular, nonviolent revolution. That is the belief that I grew up with, even before I came here and started working with Dr. Sari Nusseibeh.

Of course, I had heard a lot about Dr. Sari Nusseibeh as a leading figure in the first intifada and as a leading Palestinian intellectual. I read many of his articles, even when I was a child. And that’s how I came to adopt the principles of nonviolence and popular work. When I was in America, my activism was limited to attending lectures, participating in raising awareness, and working to promote peace and the principle of two states for two nations.

I went to the US in 1990. In 1994, the Oslo process began and gave us all a push. I decided to finish my studies and come back here in order to contribute to building my homeland. When I returned, I was shocked by the reality that I discovered. The Palestinian revolution had turned into institutions of government, but I didn’t think that transformation had happened in the right way. There were so many problems: management problems, financial problems, political problems. The collective vision had become blurred. There began to be internal squabbles over positions and influence that we never even knew existed. Maybe that kind of infighting had existed in Lebanon or Tunisia or Jordan.7 For us, for the generation that was 12 and 14 years old during the first intifada, our leaders outside were like gods. When a leaflet was published, we looked at it as if it were coming from heaven and we followed it word-for-word. If there was a strike, then everyone went on strike. There was no doubt that the call would be observed. When the political organizations gave instructions to write slogans on the walls, we did it. When there were instructions to hold a march in the streets, we participated. We never questioned why or how.

But when our leadership came back, we saw many practices that we didn’t like. I’m not talking about the top leaders, but about the second or third-tier leaders. I’m talking about people whose names we had never heard of before. That’s why a lot of us decided to keep our distance from politics. Some people decided to work in civil society. They figured that they could best start the process of state-building by contributing to civil work and the building of various institutions.

The Jerusalem Open University has special significance for me. The effort to establish the university began in the thirties, but it didn’t take on its current form until much later. It was established in 1984, and it acquired a Board of Trusties a few years later. But it only became the institution that it is today after Dr. Sari Nusseibeh took charge in 1995. When I came back to the country in 1998, I became convinced that this institution provides a great service to the country. I decided to get involved because I saw it as a kind of work that was national, but not political.

Working with Dr. Sari opened my eyes to many things. It convinced me that I had been wrong when I decided to stay away from politics out of fear of corruption. I came to realize that my impressions had been incorrect. Most of our people are not corrupt. Most are patriots working for the good of the country. Yes, it’s true that there is corruption. But we often exaggerate its extent. Besides, if all the people who are against corruption simply withdraw from public life, then corruption will spread and spread. If we leave, then those who are corrupt will be free to do whatever they please.

That’s why I decided to work for Dr. Sari on the Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy. It represents the convictions on which I was raised. These are principles with which I’ve agreed for years – before I knew there was something called this campaign, and even before the campaign was established. I agree with the principles of the campaign and I think that many others do, too. The campaign offers a grassroots framework for people to unite their efforts to find a solution and build a state.

The campaign lays out its solution in the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement,8 which consists of six points. In addition, it outlines a vision for the state. In just one year and a few months, the campaign has been able to gather the signatures of 150,000 Palestinians. This is a completely unprecedented event. Nothing like this has ever happed in Palestine or any other Arab country. On the Israeli side, Ami Ayalon is overseeing a parallel campaign. They use a different technique, and to date they have been able to gather 241,000 signatures. So all together, the Palestinians and the Israelis have collected about 400,000 names. These are all people who agree on one, clear solution.

So you started working with Sari Nusseibeh because you liked the work of the University?

At first I worked in the Modern Media Center in the university. At that time, in 1998 we were in a period of state-building. We were dreaming of a state in the year of 2000. The Media Center is still a part of the university, but it had more influence outside the university at that time than it does today. I found that the Center offered me a way to have a voice. It gave me a forum for speaking my mind, which might be considered liberal. So I looked at it as a place where I could have an impact. After all, work in the media can be more effective than work in a Ministry. I worked at the Center, and things were going well there. And then Dr. Sari came to me and asked me to manage his office at the university. With time Dr. Sari came to be in charge of the Jerusalem file,9 and then he decided to leave the Jerusalem file. He began working with the Israeli Left, and then the campaign got started. And that’s how I found myself doing political work. As I became more involved in this work, I came to a big realization. I realized that we Palestinians have enormous potential. As Palestinians, our problem is that the majority of people are silent. Most people do not belong to any party, and they’re not making their voices heard. They need to live, like all people around the world need to live. The question is: what do those people want? First of all, they want their dignity. There is no such thing as dignity when you live under occupation. They also want freedom. They want to move forward in their lives and they want to build a better future for their children. This is what any person anywhere in the world needs, not just us. Of course, there are other matters that are important for improving Palestinians’ quality of life, like scientific progress and economic development. And all of this must be in the framework of an independent state, because an independent state is the right of any human being. All people have the right to be free from occupation. Through my work with Dr. Sari I discovered that this is what the majority of people want, but we don’t hear their voices. This majority does not oppose Oslo or support Oslo.10 No, the real picture is much bigger than this. The real picture is that people support one thing: they want to live with dignity and freedom in their own independent state. This is what they want. You can put it in the framework of Oslo, you can put it in the framework of Sharm El-Sheikh,11 or you can put it in any framework you want. It doesn’t matter. The point is that people want to see results.

I discovered another thing, as well. If you look at past peace agreements or proposals for peace and reconciliation, you’ll see that they are not even known by the names of the people that made them. Take Camp David.12 Oslo. Sharm El-Sheikh. Camp David II. Or there are agreements that bear names like "Tenet"13 or "Mitchell."14 None of these names are Palestinian or even Arab. Except for Sharm El-Sheikh, perhaps, which was only a security arrangement. So you find yourself thinking, where are the ordinary people? Why don’t they speak their minds? The doctors and the bakers and the teachers and the scientists… why don’t they voice what they want?

That is how the campaign got started. The Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy was created to give people a chance to say what they want. This is the first time in Palestinian history that people have been given a chance to say what they want; to say what they think the solution should be. We show them the petition’s six points, and if they like it, they sign. We were able to gather 150,000 signatures in one year and a few months. First, this is an unprecedented success. Second, we have not only been able to reflect the voices of the people, but we’ve also shown that their voices in no way contradict the Palestinian national aim of achieving statehood.

You said that you were formerly a member of the Communist Party that is now known as the People’s Party and left after you went to the States. Was that the reason for this change or did something happen that made you think differently?

First of all I wasn’t involved in the Communist Party because I believed in the principles of Marxism. I was only 12 or 13 years old, and I didn’t even have a full grasp of Marxism. I understood what I was able to understand at that young age, but I only had a vague idea about Marx and Lenin and so on. When I went to America, however, I started reading and understanding more. I came to see that economic freedom is the foundation of democracy. For example, if I’m not free to work in the field in which I want to work, how can I be a free person? This is just one small application of the concept.

Also, I came to see that the world is heading in the direction of globalization and open markets. When Palestine becomes a State, it will be very small and have very limited resources. It would be impossible for it to survive if it had a communist system, or even a socialist system. This doesn’t mean that communism has no positive qualities. It has many positive qualities. But we need to find a middle ground between capitalism, which is the regime that rules the world we live in, and communism. We can borrow something from socialism, such as the principles of workers rights, protecting the poor, etc. We can use these principles as we should build our state. The choice isn’t black or white, we have other options. But globalization is coming, whether we like it or not, so we must go along with the open market. We can’t try to hide and reject globalization. We can’t say that globalization is an American invention and that we reject it because it’s American. We should try to adjust to the system that has become global.

When you talk about the capitalism that is "ruling the world," do you mean anything specifically?

Capitalism is not perfect, but it is the best of the available bad systems. Both communism and capitalism are bad systems, but capitalism is better. Communism is impossible, anyway. The reality is that it’s simply not possible to establish a genuinely communist regime. Regardless, the issue of communism is not even on the table anymore, neither here nor anywhere else. We’re living now in a unipolar world that operates on the principle of economic competition and the free market. If you don’t go along with it, you’re going to be left in the dust. We’ve already fallen behind plenty because of the occupation. The last thing we need is more reasons to fall behind! Besides, the nature of the Palestinian society makes it difficult to accept communism. Because of all of these reasons, I decided that communism was not an ideology that I could continue to support. So when I returned home from America, I resigned from the Communist Party. Also, one of the party’s major ideas, the principle of a popular, mass-based struggle, was adopted by the PLO15 and Fatah16 during the first intifada. That was the most important principle; the idea that all people should be involved in the national struggle. Not one person coming and carrying out an attack or doing this or that… I don’t want to go into the details on all of this now. The crux is that I prefer popular struggle, as was the case in the first intifada. I believe that this is the way that we can achieve something, as we did during the first intifada.

The first intifada succeeded in getting our rights acknowledged. It led to the conferences in Madrid17 and Oslo. Regardless of whether you see Oslo as a positive or a negative thing, just getting to the point of Oslo was a great achievement. It was an achievement that was the fruit of the Palestinian people’s efforts during the first intifada. The Palestinian people paid for it and earned it. That is exactly the opposite of what is happening now in the second intifada. This shouldn’t even been called an intifada. It’s not an intifada, but rather a war that is being waged against us. We call it an intifada, but that’s incorrect. They are shooting at us with missiles and airplanes. The people are not engaged in a revolt. They are unhappy, angry, and hurt. If you compare the period between 1987 and 1992 to the period that we are currently living, you’ll understand why they’ve led to different outcomes.

Can you tell me more about the Campaign?

The Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy is a Palestinian political current founded on the principle that decision-making should be bottom-up, not top-down. Its approach is revolutionary. It comprises the core of the Palestinian public, and it does not carry the name of some European city. It is nonviolent and grassroots. Its leaders are people who are out there in the field; people who spent a lot of time in prison, but came to adopt a commitment to nonviolence. They are people who have maintained their credibility with the public, and now their first goal is gathering signatures for the "Nusseibeh-Ayalon" Agreement. After the search for a solution, their second goal is to develop a clear vision for our state: what it will look like, how it will meet the demands of the modern era, and how it will protect the rights of its citizens.

Because this campaign springs from the heart of the Palestinian public, from the villages and refugee camps, it represents the core of democracy. It is the work of an organization whose mission is clear: to give the ordinary Palestinian an opportunity to speak up and voice his opinion. No one ever came and asked me for my opinion on the Oslo Accord. No one asked me what I thought about what happened in Madrid or at Camp David. And I don’t think they came and asked you, or asked Abu Mohammad, the baker around the corner. This campaign, in contrast, gives you the chance to say what you think. You can say whether you are for it or against it. You can agree to sign the petition and get involved in promoting it, or you can say "no thanks."

Who started the Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy?

The project was founded by Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, the current president of the campaign. The campaign is comprised of several sub-units. Let me tell you about its structure. There are sites throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A site may consist of one village, or of half a village, or of two villages put together. It depends on the size of the population in the area. Every site holds a conference, a kind of congress, in which it elects a committee to represent that location. This local committee is responsible for a number of things, such as collecting signatures or overseeing media coverage. All the committees in a given region then come together to elect people to represent them in their District Council. The District Council then elects members to join the Executive Office for that region. The Executive Office elects members from the Office and from the District Council, and these representatives make up the General Congress. The General Congress elects members to join the Executive Council. This Council consists of 51 members, 12 of whom are from Gaza and 39 from the West Bank. The Council also elects someone to serve as its President. We are also working on establishing a permanent office that will elect working committees and a technical office. The Office of the Executive Council is the main decision-maker for the campaign.

Do you have partners that do the same work on the Israeli side or is your work limited within the Palestinian society?

The work on the Israeli side is limited to collecting signatures for the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement.

What is the relationship between the Palestinian and the Israeli parts of the project?


First of all, most of the Palestinians in charge in the campaign are members of Fatah. We don’t have exact statistics, but I would estimate that some 75–80% are affiliated with Fatah. Fatah is the backbone of the Palestinian struggle, and it was the first to make peace. It leads the PLO, which remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. These are the cadres for our campaign; the ones with the capacity to make peace. On the Israeli side, we did not try to target the Left of the political spectrum, which might represent 20-25% of the Israeli public. Nor did we go to the far Right of the political spectrum, which represents some 25-30%. Rather, we have directed our message at the 45-50% of society in the middle. Sometimes these people vote Labor,18 sometimes Likud,19 and sometimes Shinui.20 This 45-50% of the Israeli public is our target audience. It is well known that we Palestinians have an enormous influence on Israeli public opinion with regard to the government’s policies towards the Palestinians. So if we work at it, we can play a role in convincing the Israeli mainstream to support the Nusseibeh-Ayalon initiative. And this is what we’re trying to do. Ami Ayalon is focusing his work on the Right and middle-Right, although there are representatives from all political parties working with him. If we can get these people on our side, then the Left will automatically follow. The left-wing is already on board. It agrees with and supports this initiative. The reason we haven’t focused on reaching the Israeli Left is that it is limited in scope. The Left has lost its credibility among the Israelis. So we are focusing on the Israeli mainstream. If you can make peace with the mainstream, the Left will follow. It is also important for Israelis to understand why Ayalon did not choose a Palestinian partner from a Leftist party. He is working with Dr. Sari Nusseibeh because he is a well-known Palestinian figure. He is known for his relations with Fatah, for his strong character, and for his credibility with the public. People know that he’s not corrupt, that he's honest with people, and that he has a clear vision. These are things that the Palestinian public needs. This is why we have chosen to work together. We didn’t join forces because we know each other and are great friends. Our relationship is just fine, but we’re working together because it serves our common goals. We are the ones who are able to bring about change. The Israeli Left is not capable of making change, at least not in the near future, not for another five or even ten years. Change will come from the Right and middle-Right. And if they are able to bring about a positive change, then the Left wing will follow. This way we guarantee the largest number of people to support our work.

In other words, the key to finding a solution is the following: first, the Palestinian public's attitude and activities affect Israeli public opinion. Second, Israeli public opinion directly influences the decisions of the Israeli government, which rules us and occupies us. So the truth of the matter is that the key to the solution is in our hands. It is not easy to tell people under occupation that the key to solution is in their hands. That is not easy at all. But our past experience proves that this is the case. Perhaps no one can influence the Israeli public more than Palestinians can. And the Israeli government reflects the attitudes of the Israeli public because Israel is a democracy for its citizens, especially its Jewish citizens. The Palestinian citizens of Israel also have rights, but these rights are not equal to that of Jewish citizens. But this is another topic, and we don’t need to get into that now.

When did the Nusseibeh-Ayalon initiative start, and what is it about?

The idea of the campaign was born after a meeting between Dr. Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon. The idea at the heart of the Agreement is the principle of two states for two peoples. Palestinians have a clear national goal: the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Likewise for the Israelis, the Zionist Movement21 is founded upon the goal of establishing a national home for the Jewish people. The ironic thing is that the two objectives are consistent. The Palestinians agree to have their state along the 1967 border. Israel cannot be a Jewish national home if it continues to have four million Palestinian Arabs living inside it.22 In other words, Israel cannot continue to occupy us. How can Israel be a Jewish state with 3.5 million Palestinians and 1.2 million Palestinian citizens of Israel? The Jewish population of Israel is only 5 or 5.5 million.23 It is impossible for it to be a Jewish state with this enormous non-Jewish population. So it is in Israelis’ interest to agree to a kind of separation. They have their country and we have ours. And this is precisely our national goal, as Palestinians. So, in principle, there is agreement on a two-state solution. However, if this solution is not implemented, and if the building of the racist separation wall24 continues and Israel continues to carry out the policies that it is carrying out now, then the establishment of a Palestinian State will no longer be possible. These practices will prevent the establishment of a Palestinian State, and the only other option will be the creation of a bi-national state. There will be no other solution. I mean, there might be other solutions, such as the creation of city-states or something of that sort. But if a two-state solution is not implemented, Palestinians are going to call for a bi-national state. Continuing to live under occupation is not an option: if we cannot get a state, then at least give us rights as citizens in your state. If this happens, however, then neither the national Palestinian objective nor the Zionist dream will be achieved. So it is in everyone’s interest to establish two states for two nations.

So you gather signatures in favor of the two-state solution?

We’re not gathering signature on the basis of a two-state solution. We gather signatures on the basis of the Palestinian national interest. The Zionist dream is not our concern. What concerns me, for example, is the future of the kids growing up in refugee camps today. I want them to have the chance to grow up in a state where they can flourish and improve their lives. I want a country that will be able to contribute to humanity in general and to the well-being of its citizens in particular. This is what I care about.

I’m not losing sleep over the Zionist dream. On the contrary, as a Palestinian, I have suffered because of the Zionist dream. But the situation that we are living in today forces me to think with my mind and not with my emotions. And this is what brings me to the goal of two states for two peoples.

And why should Israelis sign this petition? What's in it for them?

Israelis also want to be rid of us. It's not as if the occupation loves us and cannot live without us. Most Israelis just want to be rid of us.

So you think when they give you a state they will be "rid of you"?


We’re not talking about them "giving" us a state. We’re talking about them returning the land that they occupied. No one gives anybody anything. They return the territory occupied in 1967, and in exchange, they have the Jewish Israeli state that they’ve always dreamed of. They have the state established on the lands of 1948, which we recognized in Oslo.25 The nature of the relations between these two states can be determined later, because there are many different forms that might take. Some people say that the states should be completely separate. Some say there should be economic cooperation between them. Others say the borders should be open for humanitarian and religious reasons. For example, let’s say I’m a Palestinian citizen of the Palestinian state, but my family used to live in West Jerusalem. Because of this connection, perhaps I want to live in the State of Israel, while also keeping my Palestinian passport and identity, and being a part of the Palestinian political system. Similarly, there might be a Jewish man from Tel Aviv who wants to live in Nablus for religious reasons. He could remain an Israeli citizen, but would also have the right to live as a resident of Nablus. He would have permission only to reside in Nablus, just as I would have permission to reside in Jaffa. So there are many different theories and proposals. Some say it's better to establish city-states, such as the state of Ramallah, the state of Tel Aviv, and the state of Nazareth, that will be connected in a federation. Other people say, no way, we want two completely separate states. But the important thing is that you need to establish two states before you can determine what kind of relationship to establish between them. Regardless, the nature of the relationship between the states is for the people to decide. Israelis might not want to see us anymore, and we might not even want to see them. It is up to the people to decide what they want.

What kind of relationship between the two states do you personally prefer, theoretically?

Personally, what I want is two states: one Palestinian and one Israeli. This does not represent the position of the campaign, however. The campaign talks about establishing two states, but it doesn’t set forth a position on the nature of the relations between them. My personal opinion is that there should be two states. People should have the right to freedom of movement across the borders, as well as the right to reside wherever they want. For example, let’s say I’m a refugee from Jaffa. I would be a Palestinian citizen, but because of my emotional attachment to Jaffa, I could ask the Israelis for permission to live there. But I would still vote in the Palestinian state and pay taxes to a Palestinian state, etc. And if an Israeli wanted to live in Nablus or Gaza, simply because he felt a connection to these places, then he could ask the Palestinians for permission to live there. This is my vision for the distant future, however, and I don’t expect to see it in my lifetime. Maybe it could happen after 50, 70, or even 100 years. What I personally believe should happen now is total separation: the establishment of a Palestinian State completely free of settlements and the army and the return of Palestinian refugees to the Palestinian State.

This is purely my opinion, and it in no way represents the position of the campaign. As it stands now, all of the anger, pain, and foolishness on both sides prevent us from achieving this vision. Perhaps in the future it will be possible. So now, what I support is separation. Now what we need is two states for two nations. Later, after a long time, we can settle the other matters.

What are the biggest challenges you face in your work?

There is a huge amount of work to be done. I see a solution in the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Initiative, in what we call "the Goal Plan." That's why I feel a personal responsibility, which keeps me going. I am not a bank employee who goes home at two or three o’clock. My job demands that I am always working. Everywhere I go, I’m working. Whatever I do, I’m working. And this is a source of personal satisfaction for me. We encounter other challenges, as well. There is a lot of misunderstanding about what the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Initiative is all about. There are people who criticize it without even having read it. The lack of financial support also presents challenges. There are many projects and activities that we would like to do, but we cannot because we don’t have the resources. First and foremost, however, it is the Occupation that presents us with the greatest challenge. For example, we planned a demonstration in Qalqilia26 in July, but the army closed the city. The army established eight layers of military checkpoints to prevent the people from coming and participating in a peaceful demonstration. In the end about 1,500 Palestinians were able to reach the city and take part in the demonstration, which was one of the largest demonstrations to take place in Qalqilia for years.27

So the Occupation is our biggest challenge. When there is a massacre, like the one that happened in Gaza a short while ago,28 people are angry and it is difficult to talk to them about peace. When there are killings, it is hard to talk about peace. This presents a major obstacle for our work. So if we were to put the challenges that we face in order, the Occupation comes first, the lack of financial support comes second, and the lack of popular awareness about the importance of the Initiative comes third.

Did you ever have doubts that you are on the right track?

I always have doubts. I have doubts about everything. But until now, my doubts about this initiative are far less than my doubts about every other proposal out there. As far as I’m concerned, this is the initiative in which I have the fewest doubts and in which I have the most certainty.

Did your involvement in this work change your way of life?

No, this work hasn’t changed my life. Except perhaps that I work longer hours, which my fiancée doesn’t appreciate. Also, I gained weight because I don’t have time to go to the gym anymore. But beyond that, working on the campaign hasn’t really affected my life. I haven’t received any threats from anyone or anything of that sort, although some of my colleagues did when we first began. Some of those involved in founding the campaign were harassed in their jobs in different ways. But now the campaign is much stronger and has won the support of many on the street. It has such a strong presence on the Palestinian political scene that it is no longer easy for people to hassle us as they once did. So, as individuals, those involved with the campaign have paid a high price. I feel fortunate because I didn’t pay any personal price. But some of the people who represent the real backbone of this work, people who are more important than I am because they are the ones out there in the field, did suffer negative consequences due to their participation. Some people lost their jobs, and other people faced such difficulties in their workplaces that they were forced to choose between keeping their jobs and continuing to be active in the campaign. There are still people who oppose us, but it is no longer easy for people to deal with us in that way. At this point, we have a political presence, a large staff, an institutional structure, a clear vision, and popular support. So it is difficult for people to harass us in that direct, face-to-face way that they did in the beginning. People might oppose us in other ways, but not as they did before. I believe with all my heart that the Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy is the last hope to realize the Palestinian national project. I am completely convinced that it is our last hope. No other proposal currently present on the Palestinian political scene can lead to the achievement of the clear goal of Palestinian statehood. The Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy offers an unambiguous vision. It lays out its principles; one, two, three. No one else offers such a clear vision. There are those who say that we’ll accomplish our goals through negotiations. OK, we know that negotiations offer the only way, but how do we get negotiations going? How are we going to influence Israeli public opinion? How are we going to inspire our people to build civil society? How are we going to raise their awareness about equality, democracy, and human rights, as necessary to empower them to join in this struggle? I’m 100% convinced – OK, 99% convinced – that the Popular Campaign for Peace and Democracy represents Palestinians’ last hope for achieving our national goal: the establishment of a state along the 1967 borders.

You told me earlier that your parents forced you to go to the United States…

I had wanted to go to Russia to study political science. The people in the party encouraged me to do so, but when I was 17 years old, my family forced me to go to the United States. They made me study something very far from politics. They didn’t even want me to study anything connected with the liberal arts. I didn’t want to study bio-chemistry, but they forced me to.

Once I got there, I discovered many things. My knowledge and understanding expanded, and my eyes opened to a new world. I had been to the US previously for short visits, but that had not been sufficient for me to formulate an idea about the true nature of things. Being in America gave me the opportunity to read, discover, and think. It gave me a chance to see things from the outside, and to make my own decisions far from pressure from other people. And that's how I concluded that the People's Party was not the way that I could contribute to the dream of achieving Palestinians’ national goals. So I followed my own path, not the path of any particular party or political movement.

Did your resignation from the Communist Party surprise your family or yourself?

My family did not want me to be involved in any political party in the first place, because they wanted to protect me. After all, they had sent me abroad because they were fearful for me. That was their only reason for sending me outside the country. I resigned from the party, but I don’t think my family even found out until two or three years later. That was my own business, not theirs.

What about now? What do they think of your current work?


My family supports my current work 100%. They have a lot of respect for Dr. Sari Nusseibeh. They are very aware politically, and they know that what Dr. Sari says is realistic. They know that if I continue under the guidance of Dr. Sari, then I’m on the right path: a path that is realistic, and that has the potential to achieve results. They know that the organization that Dr. Sari is building is democratic, transparent, and has all the qualities that a good organization should have. But in the end, my work is not really their business, anyway. It doesn’t matter whether they like it or not. I don’t tell my father where he should work, so he doesn’t tell me where I should work, either.

What do your friends think?

Most of my friends, the ones I grew up with, belong to far left-wing parties, like the Popular Front or the Democratic Front.29 They don’t agree with what I'm doing, but at the same time they can’t offer an alternative of their own. I’ve come to an understanding with them that, until they come up with a proposal of their own, they should at the very least not oppose mine. With time, they’ve come to give me a kind of private support, although, as members of the opposition, they won’t announce it.

We continue to talk about these issues nearly daily. But until now, I can say that I cannot understand what exactly they are opposing. I simply cannot understand how they can be against something when they have no alternative to it. For me, this is a question of responsibility. If you have a sense of national responsibility, and you don’t like Plan A, then give me Plan B. If you cannot come up with an alternative, then arguing with you is a useless waste of time. This is a political issue, not a personal one. If you represent A and I represent B, then we’re talking about A and B. But if you represent A and I don’t represent anything, then I can’t just say "no, no, no."

That is why the Palestinian left wing has become so weak. They have no clear, realistic proposal to offer. And this is a very negative thing. It is important that Palestinian politics comprises a diversity of voices. It is very important to have strong, effective left-wing parties, because this ensures the presence of a variety of perspectives. Diversity is essential for building a state, for a healthy society, and for development and progress. The weakness of the Palestinian left is alarming. Granted, I strongly disagree with the Palestinian left. But at the same time, I hope that they become stronger and more active. I want their voices to be heard, for the sake of political pluralism.

Where do you, as a campaign, consider yourselves politically, Right or Left?

Our campaign is not a party, but a political current. For a number of reasons, however, most of our members happen to be affiliated with Fatah. In the first place, most Palestinians consider themselves to be members of Fatah, just like most people support peace and the establishment of a state. Fatah is the most realistic party in the Palestinian scene. Our campaign is also realistic, so it is only natural that most of the members of the campaign are from Fatah. Secondly, there are also members of the Popular Front and other parties who support the campaign. It is a political current open to all, and anyone is welcome to join regardless of the party to which they belong, or even if they do not belong to any party. The campaign reflects the desires of the public. It represents the voices of people that are not being heard, the voices of the silent majority. It represents the mainstream.

Why did you not rely on your leadership to solve the conflict, why did you take it upon yourself to do it?

The leadership is supposed to lead the process of searching for a solution to the conflict, but in practice it is not actually doing so. We respect the right of the Palestinian people to choose their leadership, and nothing that we do runs counter to this right. Our current leadership is 100% legitimate and we support it 100%. What we are doing is helping to pave the way for the realization of a solution. That way, when the time comes for a solution, the elected leadership, represented by President Yasser Arafat,30 will be able to take the steps that it must take in order to achieve a solution. We present what we have to the people, but in the end we are in no way offering an alternative to the leadership. We never will claim to be such an alternative, because we believe in the democratic right of the people to choose their leaders. We voted for Arafat. If there is another election, I will personally vote for him again. This isn’t the issue. We are only helping to help the leadership make the right decisions when the time comes to solve the conflict, establish a state, and put an end to the bloodshed and destruction.

Why do you think previous peace agreements have failed?

First and foremost, the previous peace agreements failed because none of them ever stated a clear objective. They never stated where they would lead us in the end. Oslo said that there would be a transitional phase, but no one knew the final destination. Then came the Road Map. That road can take you to many different places because it had no clear endpoint. That's why the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Initiative puts forth what we call "the Goal Plan." This goal plan can be used in conjunction with the Road Map or other agreements.

There have been other short-term agreements as well, but none has indicated where they are leading. The Road Map starts with the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government, and then it leads to one stage and another stage and yet another stage. But then what? We hold a conference? No, this won’t work. An agreement must tell us from the beginning where we are going. If we want to go from point A to point B, we want to know how we’re going to get there. We cannot simply leave it to circumstance. We’re not only talking about statehood. We’re talking about the future of our nation, the future of our children. We need to know where we’re headed.

Did you have to give up anything to be involved in this work?

I’ve given up my time, which is very precious for me. I’ve also given up personal things. But I am completely committed to this work, so I don’t think of this as a high price to pay. For me, even the personal time lost is a small price to pay for the opportunity to be involved in this valuable work.

What do you consider a small success?

Success will come in stages. The first stage will be when the majority of people agree with the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement. The second will come, after the people have accepted it, when the Palestinian leadership also approves it. The third will be when the Israeli government, in agreement with the Palestinian government, implements the Agreement. And finally, success will be complete when the Palestinian State is established; when Palestinian society achieves its vision for a state.

End.


Notes

We have done our best to provide accurate, fair yet succinct footnotes to help you navigate the interviews. Our research team comprises more than 6 individuals, including Palestinians, Israelis and North Americans. Still, we recognize that these notes cannot capture the full complexity of this contested conflict. Therefore, we encourage you to seek additional sources of information, we welcome your feedback and appreciate your openness.

Jerusalem Known as Al Quds (“The Holy”) in Arabic and Yerushalayim or Zion in Hebrew. A city located in the center of both Israel and the West Bank portion of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Home to approximately 730,000 people from all three monotheistic religions, as well as sacred sites from these faiths within close proximity, including the Western Wall, the al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The Green Line, or the 1949 cease-fire line between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, demarcates the unofficial boundary between Israel and the West Bank, and divides Jerusalem. Israel immediately declared Jerusalem as its capital in 1948, and enshrined this in its Basic Laws in 1980. Palestinians aspire to declare Jerusalem as the capital of a nascent Palestine. Following the War of 1967, Israel extended its sovereignty to the Eastern half of the city, including the Old City and the holy shrines, which were controlled by Jordan from 1948. Israel “unified” East and West Jerusalem in its 1980 “Jerusalem Law”, leaving borders undefined. Most countries do not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the entire city, an opinion codified in UN Security Council Resolution 478. Rather, they regard Jerusalem’s status as undetermined, pending final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. See: “Jerusalem” Kumaraswamy, P.R. Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2006. To read the text of the 1980 Basic Law see Basic Law-Jerusalem-Capital of Israel. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 June 2007.

First Intifada Arabic for “shaking off.” The term “intifada” is used to refer to uprisings, especially during times of widespread Palestinian revolts against Israel. While some scholars consider the 1936-39 Palestinian uprising as the first intifada, the first intifada (1987-1993) usually refers to the popular uprising whereby Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose up against Israeli military rule through a coordinated movement involving multiple sectors of Palestinian society. Actions included mass rallies, general strikes, unarmed and stone-throwing confrontations, the use of Molotov cocktails and limited arms against the Israeli army, combined with self-administration of daily life and attempts at nonviolent civil disobedience. The Israeli military was unable to quash the rebellion, although they implemented a harsh “Force, Might and Beatings” policy under Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, involving widespread arrests, detention and reports of torture. This intifada came to an end when Israel entered into negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization and co-launched the Oslo Peace Process. See King, Mary Elizabeth. A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance. New York: Nation Books, 2007 and Farsoun, Samih K. and Naseer H. Aruri. Palestine and the Palestinians, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2006. See online “The Intifada.” MERIP. 25 June 2007 http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/intifada-87-pal-isr-primer.html and “Intifada.” MSN Encarta Online. 25 June 2007 http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761579974/Intifada.html

Jerusalem Open University Has educational study centers in numerous Palestinian cities. One of the major aims of the Jerusalem Open University is to provide higher education services for the Palestinian population at-large in the West Bank and Gaza (Occupied Territories). In 2004, the student intake reached 40,501. See the University’s website at http://www.qou.edu.

Dr. Sari Nusseibeh (1949-) Sari Nusseibeh is a professor and President of Al Quds University and former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative in Jerusalem. Nusseibeh is considered a leading Palestinian intellectual and vocal advocate for a non-violent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He co-authored the People's Voice Initiative with former Israeli security head Ami Ayalon. See http://www.hashd.org

A part of Al-Quds University, the Institute of Modern Media was established in 1996. Its major objectives include raising the "technical level of Palestinian television productions" and supporting "cooperation between local independent television stations through program exchange and training." See http://www.alquds.edu/centers_institutes/imm

Palestinian People's Party (PPP)/Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) The PPP is a leftist PLO faction founded in 1982 as the Palestinian Communist Party, although it draws on the work and ideology of previous communist factions dating to the mid-1920s. It rejected its Leninist past in 1991 and embraced a democratic, pragmatic and popular agenda, with Bashir Barghouti at its head between 1982-1998. In 1998 it held its third convention in Ramallah, electing Han Amira, Abdel Majid Hamdan and Mustafa Barghouti at the head of the General Secretariat. Bassam Salhi is the current head of the Secretariat. Mustafa Barghouti has since left the party. See “About us.” Palestinian People’s Party. 11 September 2007 http://www.palpeople.org/viewPage.aspx?subjectid=6

Following the June War or Six-Day War of 1967, the PLO and other Palestinian organizations increasingly shifted their base of (guerilla) operations to Jordan. Regarded as a threat by King Hussein, armed Palestinian organizations as well as many Palestinian civilians were given a bloody dismissal by the Jordanian military in September of 1970, in what has become known as Black September. The PLO and other organizations shifted their base of operations to Lebanon. However, in the midst of the Civil War in Lebanon (1975-1990) and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), many Palestinian organizations were forced to set up their organizations and operations elsewhere. The PLO and Yasser Arafat, who was expelled from Lebanon, went to Tunis, Tunisia. Arafat and the PLO returned to the West Bank and Gaza (The Occupied Territories) following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.

For a text of the six-point statement of principles see Mifkad or Hashd.

Refers to Nusseibeh’s role as senior PLO representative in Jerusalem.

Oslo Process This process was unveiled with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993, although it was preceded by an exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat and back-channel negotiations by Israeli and Palestinian academics. In those letters, Israel recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. The DOP called for a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on United Nation Resolutions 242 and 338. It also led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA or PNA) as part of the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement. Yasser Arafat became President of the PNA. A series of agreements between the Israeli government and the PNA followed. The agreements are known collectively as the Oslo Accords. The Oslo process was set back with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. After the failure of the Camp David Accords in 2000, it ended with the assumption of the second intifada in September 2000. See Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. Boston: University of Arizona, 2004. See “The Oslo Declaration of Principles.” MidEast Web. 13 September 1993. 11 September 2007 http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm

Refers to the agreement signed on September 4, 1999 signed by PLO President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. For a text of the agreement seewww.palestine-un.org

Camp David An American presidential getaway in Maryland. In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, two significant events took place at Camp David, often referred to as Camp David I and Camp David II. At Camp David I (September 1978), Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin reached a bilateral agreement, with assistance and pressure from American President Carter, in which Israel would return the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for recognition and peace with Egypt, thereby establishing a precedent for “land-for-peace” negotiations. The Agreement called for talks between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestinian representatives to create a framework for negotiations regarding the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This goal was never met. Camp David II refers to the last Oslo process-related meetings between Yasser Arafat, Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in the summer of 2000 over “final status” issues such as the settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood, the rights and entitlements of Palestinian refugees and more. Negotiations broke down and no agreement was reached. The collapse of the process was followed shortly thereafter by the second intifada. See Swisher, Clayton E. The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story of the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process. New York: Nation Books, 2004, Sher, Gilead. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001: Within Reach. London & New York: Routledge, 2006, Shamir, Shimon and Bruce Maddy-Wetzman, eds. The Camp David Summit-What Went Wrong? Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005 and Malley, Robert and Hussein Agha. “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors.” New York Review of Books (August 9 2001), pp 59-65, online at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380

Tenet Plan Refers to the Tenet Plan, a cease-fire and security plan signed by security organizations of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The plan went into effect in June of 2001 but not need lead to the resumption of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians as the plan had hoped. For a text of the Tenet Plan, see: http://www.mideastweb.org/tenet.htm.

Refers to the fact-finding commission led by former US Sen. George Mitchell in 2001.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, has long been the umbrella group that includes numerous Palestinian political, professional, and trade groups, all dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In 1969, Yasser Arafat, representing al-Fatah, the largest fedayeen (see “fedayeen” in glossary) militia group in the PLO, became chair of the organization, a position he held until his death in 2004. The umbrella group was the first of its kind among Palestinians, and united disparate factions and organizations in a unitary cause, namely the establishment of a Palestinian state. The PLO carried out numerous international attacks against Israelis in the early 1970s as well guerilla operations aimed at Israel and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. They operated from bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The PLO first gained international legitimacy when Chairman Yasser Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly in November of 1974 and the organization was granted observer status to the United Nations. It signed on to the Oslo peace process in 1993, and has since seen its leadership absorbed into the Palestinian Authority (PA), pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement. While the PLO Charter of 1968 did not recognize Israel’s right to exist, the Charter was amended in 1996 following the Oslo Accord Declaration of Principles (DOP). The amendment to the Charter voided “those articles which denied Israel’s right to exist or are inconsistent with the PLO’s new commitments to Israel following their mutual recognition.” See Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003, Bickerton, Ian J and Carla L. Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007 and Hamid, Rashid. “What is the PLO?” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 4, No. 4. (Summer, 1975), pp. 90-109. See online “Palestine Liberation Organization.” Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. 11 September 2007 http://www.un.int/palestine/theplo.shtml

Fatah ("Al-Fatah") Arabic for “conquest”, Fatah is a reverse acronym for the “Palestine Liberation Movement” (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistani). Fatah is the largest Palestinian political party in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and the dominant faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Founded in Kuwait in the late 1950s by Yasser Arafat to fight for the establishment of a secular democratic Palestinian national state on all of the territory of British Mandatory Palestine. It began paramilitary and political operations in 1964, and assumed the leadership of the PLO in 1968. The organization’s tactics of “armed struggle” especially in the 1970s and 80s, included bombings, assassinations and hijackings in the Middle East, including Israel, and international locations. After Yasser Arafat’s signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in 1993, many Fatah leaders moved from Tunisia to the West Bank and Gaza Strip to serve in the political establishment and security forces of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). During the years of the “Oslo peace process” (1993-2000), the party shifted away from militancy and became identified as the chief proponent of a negotiated, two-state solution. From the launching of the second intifada through to the death of Yasser Arafat (2000-2004), Fatah experienced a split between factions supporting a return to negotiations, and factions such as the “Tanzim” and “Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades” which resumed armed struggle against Israel and claimed responsibility for attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians. This division persists today. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), assumed leadership of Fatah and the PLO after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, and was elected President of the PNA in January 2005. See Parsons, Nigel. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. New York & London: Routledge, 2005. See Bowley, Graham. “Al-Fatah.” The New York Times. 20 June 2007. 25 June 2007

Madrid Conference (October 1991-Summer 1993) Also known as the “Madrid Peace Talks” or “Madrid Summit.” Refers to the international peace conference held in Madrid in 1991, following the Gulf War that consisted of nine rounds of negotiations. Co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, it was the first time that representatives from Israel, the Palestinian community, and representatives from Arab countries that had not yet formally recognized Israel came together to discuss the prospects for peace in direct negotiations. The talks were based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the Camp David Accords of 1978, accepting the “land-for-peace” formula for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the summit did not lead to the creation of a concrete agreement, some argue that it brought down the Shamir/Likud government and led to the back-channel negotiations that brought about the Oslo Accords. It was also a precursor to the Jordanian-Israeli 1994 Peace Treaty. See Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000 and Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. Boston: University of Arizona, 2004. See online “The Madrid Framework.” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28 January 1999. 7 September 2007 

Labor Party Mifleget Avodah in Hebrew. One of two major political parties in Israel that tends toward the center-left of the political spectrum, it emerged from the labor Zionist movement in the 1930s. Its leaders include many of the principal founders of the State of Israel, including the first Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Founded on socialist and Zionist principles, it dominated the Israeli government until 1977. Labor became the leading Israeli political party favoring territorial compromise for peace, and was the party that first officially recognized the PLO when Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres signed the Declaration of Principles and launched the Oslo Peace Process with Yasser Arafat in 1993. See online “Israel Labor Party.” Knesset. 7 September 2007. http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=0

Likud Party Hebrew for “union”. One of two traditional political parties in Israel, founded in 1973. Likud tends toward the conservative, center-right of the political spectrum. The Likud grew out of the “Revisionist” movement of Ze’ev Jabotinsky as the main right-wing opposition to the dominant Labor Zionist Movement and Labor Party. Its early leaders, such as Yitzhak Shamir and Menachem Begin, had roots in the Stern Gang and Irgun—two organizations that employed militant tactics against the British and occasionally Arab inhabitants during the time of the British Mandate. Likud was ideologically committed to establishing Jewish sovereignty over all of British Mandatory Palestine and, until recently, ideologically opposed to any territorial compromise with the Palestinians (“Land for Peace”). Its first electoral victory came in 1977. Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin, during the first Likud mandate, signed a peace treaty with Egypt, which involved Israeli military and civilian withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula following the “Land for Peace” model. Begin subsequently launched the War of 1982, with Ariel Sharon serving as Minister of Defense. In 1991 Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir headed the Israeli negotiation team at the Madrid Conference, spearheading Arab-Israeli direct negotiations. More recent Likud leaders, such as Benjamin Netanyahu, have led neo-liberalist economic measures. Dispute over Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 led Likud Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to leave the party and establish the Kadima (Hebrew, “forward”) party, which rivaled the Likud and won in the 2006 elections. See online “Likud.” Knesset. 7 September 2007. http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=13

Shinui Party Shinui (Hebrew for “change”). A political party in Israel tending toward the center of the political spectrum. Shinui is explicitly secular as a counterpoint to religious parties in the Knesset. See online “Shinui.” Upstart Activist.” 9 November 2007 http://www.israelvotes.com/demo/platforms_shinui.html

Zionism The belief that the Jewish people should have a national homeland, and refuge from persecution, in Israel. Supporters of this idea are called Zionists. The Zionist Movement took shape in Europe in the late 1800s with the First Zionist Conference in Basel, Switzerland. The movement advocated the ideology of Zionism, a national liberation ideology of the Jewish people with several strands, foremost being the establishment of a Jewish state within the biblical Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael or Zion). Zionism has many manifestations, from religious to secular, each defining a distinct view of which land should be settled, and how it should be done. See http://www.mideastweb.org/zionism.htm

According to the Israeli Government, 1.5 million people of Israel’s population are non-Jews and defined collectively as Arab citizens of Israel. See http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/People/SOCIETY-+Minority+Communities.htm. According to the CIA World Fact Book, the population of the West Bank is roughly 2.3 million people (not including Jewish settlers) and 1.3 million people in the Gaza Strip (not including Jewish settlers). See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

The CIA World Fact places the population of Israel at 6.2 million, which includes the settler population in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights (Occupied Territories). See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html.

Separation Barrier Also termed the “wall, separation wall, security fence and Apartheid Wall”, and “annexation wall,” by some. A long structure of connected walls and fences that separates Israel from parts of the West Bank, and restricts the movement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel. It runs both along the Green Line and within the West Bank. Critics and proponents disagree over the intent behind the structure, its route, and its name. Begun in 2002 as an alleged reaction to the violence of the second intifada, its construction is still in progress. Israel claims security concerns necessitate its construction, and cite decreases in suicide bombings within Israel since its construction as proof that the structure is both effective and required. Opponents claim the structure is an attempt to annex occupied Palestinian territory and unilaterally define future borders. They also maintain that the route of the barrier steals privately owned land, and makes certain Palestinian villages and cities economically unviable. Israel has modified some of the routes in response to an Israeli High Court of Justice ruling as well as in response to international pressure, but the route is still disputed. The debate over its legality was flamed after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion declaring it a breach of international law. See Kershner, Isabel. Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. For online statistics and analysis see “Separation Barrier.” B’Tselem. 9 November 2007 http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation%5FBarrier/

Declaration of Principles The Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by the PLO and Israel in September of 1993, calls for a phased peace process including permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on United Nation Resolutions 242 and 338. The DOP is complemented by an exchange of letters between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat shortly before the signing of the Declaration of Principles. In those letters, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. See Fischbach, Michael R. “Oslo Agreements.” Philip Mattar, ed. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005. For the text of the DOP see online 1993 Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords). Foundation for Middle East Peace. 21 June 7007

Qalqilia Palestinian City located in the Northwest of the West Bank, bordering Israel along the Green Line. The city is encircled by the separation barrier. Est. population 45,000.

See http://www.hashd.org/english/y/HASHD%20Press%20Release%20July%2016,%202004.htm

Most likely refers to an Israeli incursion into the Rafah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip in May of 2004, during which numerous Palestinians were killed. Khalil Hamra. "At Least Ten Palestinians Killed by Israeli Tank Fire in Gaza Strip, Five Killed in Separate Clashes, "Associated Press, International News, 20 May 2004. Melissa Radler and Herb Keinon. "UN Calls on Israel to Stop Demolishing Rafah Homes," The Jerusalem Post, 21 May

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its offshoot, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), combine Arab nationalist and Marxist-Leninist ideologies. They advocate the creation of a secular democratic Palestine as a precursor to a broader revolution within the Arab world. Founded in the late 1960s by George Habash, the PFLP became the second largest faction within the PLO after joining in 1970, but withdrew its membership with the launch of the Oslo Accords. The PFLP uses both political and militant means—notably hijackings and political assassinations—to advance its aims. In 1994, the Israeli military assassinated its leader, Abu Ali Mustafa (successor to George Habash). His successor, Ahmad Saadat, was imprisoned by the Palestinian National Authority (PA or PNA) following pressure by Israel for the October 2001 assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister, Rechavam Ze’evi. The PFLP’s current leader is Ahmed Jibril. See Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003 and Nigel Parsons. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. New York & London: Routledge, 2005. See online “Backgrounder.” 31 October 2005. Council on Foreign Relations. 18 October 2007 http://www.cfr.org/publication/9128/

Interview was conducted before Yasser Arafat passed away.