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Interview with Majed Tbeileh

Tell us briefly about yourself and how you began doing the work you are now involved in.

I am Majed Tbeileh, I live in Nablus1 and I have been doing this work since 1995. When I started working with the Nablus Youth Federation ,2 it dealt with internal issues related to children, youth, women and voluntary humanitarian work. In 1996 the founders’ committee of the Federation, of which I was a member, started to believe in the need for a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. During that period I was the foreign affairs coordinator for the Federation. My work was to contact different Israeli organizations and donors about the Israeli-Palestinian program. I worked in that post until 2000, after which I was the head of the program’s executive board. During that period, there were numerous organizations working for peace among Palestinians and Israelis. At that time the Federation worked with 56 organizations inside Israel and with the Arabs of 1948.3 We held Israeli-Palestinian and Palestinian-Palestinian dialogues. In 1999, we had started working on interfaith dialogue. This idea originated in Nablus, which is the only city in which three religions, Islam, Christianity and the Samaritans,4 live together and have warm relations. The project started as a conference that was held by the Nablus City Council backed by Ghassan Shaka’a, head of the local council.5 From there we started to look for Israeli organizations that deal with religious rights. We worked with Yehuda Stolov, who works at the Interfaith Encounter Association.6

We had contacts with Israelis prior to the intifada,7 and when the intifada started, all the meetings stopped completely. This lasted for about a year. During that period, the Federation worked on internal issues like children’s and women’s issues, as well as providing aid to the community. At that point, the Federation reached a decision that it was the right time to work for peace, but some of the organizations we worked with simply disappeared. We tried to contact these organizations, but they apparently ceased to exist. They didn’t take a clear stand on the developing political situation and events. Our federation, on the other hand, issued a protocol outlining basic goals around which the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue could be constructed. We tried to connect several Palestinian and Israeli organizations to consider that document, but there was clear hesitation. If anything, they wanted to do this work secretively, but we refused this, because we wanted to be clear about what we were doing.

The strategy of conducting such meetings became clearer after 2001, but prior to that there were hidden motivations and deception between both sides. Many wanted to meet simply so the world could see them meeting, but the intifada proved that all these meetings were meaningless and useless. It proved that the Palestinian-Israeli peace camp had failed. This was a result of the intifada. Consequently, we reached a clear decision based on our experience in the struggle. We decided that we needed to involve members that were imprisoned or wounded, in addition to our regular members. We decided to create a protocol that would provide a framework for all joint work between Israelis and Palestinians. This was especially important in the Nablus area, which had witnessed a lot of bloodshed during the siege that it endured and continues to suffer in the current situation.8

The protocol consisted of four main points. The first was the right of return for all the Palestinian refugees;9 every Palestinian refugee has the right to decide where to return to -- the 1948 areas, to the 1967 areas, or not to return at all. This decision should be personal, and it should be the decision of each and every Palestinian refugee. The second point concerned Jerusalem10 and the return to the borders of 1967.11 Jerusalem and the 1967 territories are part of the Palestinian state. There is no giving up on Jerusalem, which is the capital of the two states, and there is no giving up on the 1967 territories and the Gaza Strip,12 which are both part of the Palestinian state. The third point was the release of all Palestinian prisoners. I mean -- there was peace with the Jordanians but there were still Jordanian prisoners being held in Israel, so that can’t be real peace.13 There can be no peace while there is even one Palestinian prisoner being held by Israel, because we cannot enjoy peace if those who have fought for it are still imprisoned. The fourth point was that it is only the Palestinians who have the right to choose their leaders, rule their land, control their border crossings and govern all other aspects of the Palestinian state.

We were surprised by Israeli groups’ reactions to these demands; and they call themselves peace groups... We asked them what kind of peace they want, a peace in which we sit down together and talk and invite the world to watch? Frankly, I salute NSWAS,14 because they recognized those rights and recognized that Palestinians should meet with the Israelis according to a clear protocol. It was the first time that Palestinians and Israelis determined the agenda together. To be honest, many Palestinian organizations acted as employees for Israeli organizations. I have evidence of this because I have worked in this field for nine years.

We had a clear agenda for work with Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam. Today the Federation maintains contact with only three of the 56 Israeli organizations that we used to associate with. Even if we were contacted by these other organizations, we wouldn’t be willing to reply. We contacted Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam because they consistently provided free medical treatment for the needy, and because their political positions were very clear. We are grateful for this and continue to work and meet with them at every possible opportunity.

Interfaith Encounter Association is more religiously oriented than political, so unfortunately we didn’t reach a political agreement with them. It was clear that the work with them was only of a religious nature. Another organization, which is a part of Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam, in addition to School for Peace15 is Zochrot,16 which works in the field of interfaith dialogue. We are going to meet with this organization in Switzerland. A Japanese organization called Religion for the Children is organizing this meeting.We managed to reach a political and religious agreement with Zochrot, and we will try to work with them in the future.

As a Palestinian association, we are caught in the middle. As the saying goes, “The enemy is ahead of you and the sea is behind you.” We have been working for nine years and still don't have an official license from the Palestinian Authority.17 This is a problem. We tried to use our contacts to obtain an official license, but we didn't manage to achieve it. There is no problem in finding funding for joint work with the Israelis; the Israeli organizations receive the funding and provide for our side of it. A Palestinian organization aiming to do joint work with Israelis cannot get funding on it's own because it cannot get licensed, even with clear objectives. We appealed to the PA many times, but their terms for a license and funding required that we stop working with the Israelis.

We respect those who reject and fight the occupation18 in military ways, but there is no military campaign without a political campaign. Every person has their specialty and place within the struggle. We will continue holding joint meetings with the Israelis according to the protocol we created in 2001, and we will continue doing this despite all the difficulties.

Currently, the Palestinian public rejects us. Despite this, we hold meetings every week, and the number of our members has grown from 750 before the intifada to 1500 today. If we held a concert, 5000 people would attend. We make it clear that we hold meetings with the Israelis, it is published on our website. We hold meetings and invite people to discuss their positions on the struggle and the positions of the other side. We don’t tell the Palestinians that we are inviting them for an outing, but for a meeting with Israelis, not just to talk about peace but to talk about where they are in relation to the conflict. As the executive committee of the Federation, we are convinced of the importance of what we are doing. Still, when I walk through the city I expect to be hurt at any moment. I work in a city that hasn’t yet fully recognized that there should be dialogue in addition to the military struggle. I will continue doing my work despite all this.

As for my earlier personal history, I was born on the 18th of September 1978. I didn’t graduate from high school because I had been arrested by the Israelis at that time. I was injured during the first intifada19 as well as the current one. I was supposed to be in Germany during the incursion in April 2004,20 but I was arrested for ten days and held in the Hawara21 detention camp. The Israelis didn’t allow me to travel outside the country for a year until B’Tselem22 hired a lawyer to get me permission to travel. Until this day, I am denied entry to Israel, though I currently visit Jerusalem to meet with people from Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam. The Israelis are refusing to give me a permit23 because they claim that I am a threat to the State of Israel. I don’t know what threat I present to them. At the same time, Palestinians always criticize us for holding meetings with Israelis. We are caught in the middle. I don’t have a problem with this because I believe that God created every person with a message. My message in this world is that the Palestinian youth should think about where they are and what their situation is. For 55 years, we didn’t know where we were and what we wanted. I think that after the Oslo peace agreement,24 the Palestinian Authority took us back to square one; they didn’t let us know where we were standing. The Palestinian public suffers from desperation. It doesn’t know if it wants to resist or not, or whether it wants the occupation to end or not.

One of the reasons for this situation is that there are no youth organizations that reflect the desires of this age group. Another sector of Palestinian society we should focus on is that of the children of Palestine. We should allow the children to express themselves, play, draw and be happy. In the current situation, the conflict, in which children face tanks and are sometimes caught in the middle of the armed struggle, we forget that children are still children despite the tragedy. We should enable children to enjoy their childhood as much as possible so that they won’t become violent in the future, not in terms of political violence only but in terms of domestic violence as well. Many Palestinian children who grow up in this situation become violent domestically. Personally, I am more concerned about the issues of youth and children than about the other issues I mentioned.

What personal events inspired you to work in this field?

I was a member of a political organization during the first intifada, and was known for being involved in resistance, throwing stones and so on. I think that you learn more from experience than from universities and schools. For 50 years, the Palestinians have been convinced that the Israeli state, the Hebrew state, is going to vanish. I respect everyone who works for their country regardless of nationality -- Israeli or Palestinian. I have reached the conclusion that the only way for us to end the occupation of the Territories25 is through dialogue. Armed resistance was not able to rescue us, to end the occupation.

I started to see the importance of having meetings with the Israelis in 2001, especially after the invasion of Nablus in 2002 because I realized that even if we manage to destroy a tank here or explode a bomb there, we still don’t have the military capacity to stop an Israeli invasion. The only way to cause the Israelis to withdraw to the 1967 borders is through political dialogue.

The Israelis know nothing about the Palestinians. They only view them as workers, thieves, ignorant people, or terrorists. The Israelis should recognize that the Palestinians are educated people that earn their living in a decent way. They also need to understand that even the land that the State of Israeli is situated on, the 1948 borders, was part of Palestine.26 In many meetings, I tell the Israelis that we gave up 78% of historical Palestine. The Israelis don’t realize this. The Israelis act according to the Zionist27 ideology, because this is how they were brought up. Palestinians were also brought up to bear a grudge against Israelis. The way I see it, Jews have a lot of influence on world media, while Palestinians haven’t succeeded in bringing their cause to the attention of the world in a way that is beneficial to them. During these meetings we are trying to learn from the Israelis how to use world opinion.

What made you choose to do this work rather than join the armed resistance?

I reached the conclusion that throwing a stone won’t get me a state, nor will carrying a gun. I will give you an example. The first intifada lasted for seven years, but it didn't have as huge an impact as the second intifada. There wasn’t as much support or as many demonstrations around the world for the Palestinians as there was this time. I will explain why I think so. During the first intifada, Palestinians used stones and basic tools to protest, whereas the weapons used in the second intifada took the form of resistance to the next level. Also, the number of victims among Palestinians and Israelis was much higher. Keep in mind that the first intifada mostly happened in Palestinian towns and cities, so the Israeli public wasn’t directly affected by it and therefore didn’t pay attention to the Palestinian suffering. In contrast, subsequent suicide bombings inside Israel caused a change in the Israeli mainstream and some began to call for dismantling settlements and giving the Palestinians what they want so they [the Israelis] could spare themselves the headache.

Today there is awareness around the world regarding the Palestinians’ situation. This happened despite the Israeli efforts to limit media coverage to bombings. I think that those bombings helped the Palestinian people; those didn’t happen just out of the blue. The Palestinians have succeeded in influencing the Israelis to the extent that they want to withdraw from the 1967 areas so that the bombings will stop. There are means that we as Palestinians should use. I never reject or condemn the nationalist and military operations, nor do I call them terrorism; on the contrary. I call these operations heroic because they forced the Israelis to recognize the borders of 1967. This is an issue I am not willing to yield on. I still think that we should hold meetings and dialogue with the Israelis and the rest of the world.

This might sound like a contradiction. You might ask, how can you want peace and still support military operations? The first intifada lasted for seven years and didn’t reach the ears of the Israelis. We know this from meetings with the Israelis that we work with. If there is a bombing inside Israel, it is the first thing that is mentioned by the Israelis during the meetings. But there would be no bombings if not for the occupation, so my response to that is that if they leave the territories of 1967 there will be no more military operations. I think the Palestinian media has a weakness in exploiting the situation on a global level to our benefit. There is also a weakness in the exploitation of phenomena in the Israeli society to the benefit of the Palestinians, like the refusal of certain Israelis to serve in the army.28

I feel that my battle doesn’t involve carrying a rifle or throwing stones, but that it revolves around addressing the world. I think that my battle is more difficult than that of those who carry the rifles. Those who carry the rifles only fight, but my battle appeals to minds. It is very hard to appeal to the minds of people and to convince them to listen to what you have to say. When the Israelis witness an incursion and bombing of a Palestinian city they understand why Palestinians blow themselves up. If our CDs were distributed on a wider scale by the organizations, the world would also know why the Palestinians blow themselves up. These CDs are about summer camps for children. Our next CD will be about the suffering of children during the incursions into Nablus and how to work with the children in an enjoyable and educational way in order to allow them to express themselves. The area of the northern West Bank29 is severely neglected, especially the Nablus area.

How do you explain the benefit of your work to someone who has no idea about the conflict?

My work is beneficial in the way that it allows the Israelis and Palestinians to know where they are and what their situation is. Peace isn’t an agreement between Arafat30 and Rabin,31 Arafat and Peres32 -- between the leaders of the two people. Real peace is peace between the two people. Every person is a human being. A human being should know what he or she wants and where he or she is located within the conflict. I try to encourage every Palestinian and Israeli to think and ask about their position in the conflict and think about his or her role in ending the conflict.

Where will you head from here?

I will return to Nablus and recruit a new group for meetings with university students.

And on a wider scale?

I hope to be able to visit a country every day to show them our work, in order to receive support and funding from them. I am only 27 years old and have many years ahead of me. I have nine years of experience in this work already and I am still only at the first step. I think that Palestinians should try to determine their position in the conflict. We are sentimental people. When Abu Mazen33 came to power in 2004 [as Prime Minister] people were optimistic and thought that all the problems were solved. There is talk today about the resignation of Abu Ala.34 I think that Abu Ala will resign and will be followed by many others. My personal expectation is that this year is going to be a bloody year. I think that there will be peace in the end, but I think that this will take two or three years. I expected the assassination of Rantisi35 and Ahmed Yassin36 and expect that the Israelis will assassinate Arafat as well.37 I think Israel will assassinate a large number of Palestinian leaders38 because Israel has received the green light to do so from George Bush.39 I think that Israeli oppression in the West Bank will continue. I expect the resistance to react and assassinate Israeli ministers. I think that this year will be a bloody year because neither Israelis nor Palestinians know where they stand. I expect Sharon40 to be replaced by Mofaz.41 Israel assassinated Ahmed Yassin, who was more powerful than Arafat on the Palestinian street. There was condemnation by the world and threats by Hamas42 for revenge that I think will materialize, but the world has quickly forgotten the issue. I think that they [Israelis] will assassinate Arafat in the future and there will be no international response. I think these things will happen because nobody is interested in these issues and in the Palestinian situation. The battle in Nablus was more violent than the battle in Jenin,43 but the media focused on Jenin.44

There is no organized Palestinian reaction to Israeli aggression or organized planning for dealing with the situation. The Israelis also don’t know what their situation is. The Israeli peace camp amounts to no more than one or two percent of the Israeli people. We as Palestinians should concentrate our efforts on three main points: the first point is the Palestinian society. We should work in order to determine our own position. The second point is to work with the Israeli people. The third point is to work with the world. The Israeli government commits violent and aggressive acts, but the Israeli people are those who elect the government, therefore we should talk to the Israeli people. On the other hand, the Israelis accuse the Palestinians of killing and bombing. I think we should use the most efficient strategy that ensures furthering Palestinian interests. I don’t think that the Palestinians will agree upon a united course of action.

Those who pay the price of all this and act as fuel for the conflict are the Palestinian youths. The Palestinians were fuel for the first and second intifada, spending scores of years in prisons and enduring all the humiliations for years at the hands of the occupiers, especially those that were disabled and became burdens on their families. If this intifada ends now and we reach a political agreement, it will take 20 years to return to normal life. We have had thousands of prisoners, injuries, destroyed families, and causes for revenge. The Palestinians don’t have a clear agenda. They don’t know if they want to be a part of Israel or Jordan or if they want the occupation to end or to live under international security forces or not. This situation is a result of the lack of a political leadership to determine policies for the future of the people.

In what way do you think your work helps in developing the awareness for peace?

I think that the most important thing for us, as Palestinians and as the younger generation, is to recognize that there are two countries for two peoples. This is the first step in ending the conflict. We live a life of occupation and closure, and when we visit Jordan or another country we feel that it is a different world. We should be able to manage our own affairs and have our own agenda and not have to rely on the help of other countries. We want Jerusalem to be the capital of the Palestinian state, and we won’t accept the criticism from other Arab nations about our handling of this issue, because they don’t endure the same difficult conditions that we do. Palestinian youths should not leave their homeland and seek a life abroad. They should stay in Palestine, withstand the situation, and seek peace as a means of improving their lives in Palestine.

What are the challenges you face in your work?

I face many challenges. Because I believe in this work, the situation of ignorance poses a significant challenge. It is possible to have a dialogue with an educated person and convince them even if they have an opposite ideology, but an ignorant person might just pull out a gun and shoot you, accuse you of betrayal. Another challenge is encounters with Israeli military forces. If I am caught inside Israel, I will serve six months in prison because I don’t have a permit. Despite all the challenges, I personally feel obliged to carry out my role in this battle.

Did you ever have doubts that you are doing the right work?

No. During the incursion into Nablus in 2002,45 I was in the old city and witnessed people being killed and injured. I reached the conclusion that this must stop. After that experience, I am willing to die for the sake of doing my work. I reached the conclusion that we have no chance in facing the Israeli military. I witnessed things there that I won’t forget for the rest of my life. I witnessed things that will make me consider for the rest of my life where we stand and what our situation is.

How are you received by your community?

There are many surprises. To be honest, I am rejected by half of the [Palestinian] community because my work involves meetings with Israelis. The half that rejects my work wants to meet with Israelis, but is afraid to do so because of nationalist and conservative pressure. I compel myself by force. I compel myself using the force of my personality, and I am willing to face the consequences of my work. I am convinced that every Palestinian should meet with Israelis. I am also convinced that many Palestinians want to meet with Israelis but are afraid of the reaction of the community. There is a conflict inside every Palestinian, between the urge to participate in the meetings with Israelis and the fear of the reaction of the community. This is my life. Many members of the Federation are held as prisoners by Israel and I can do nothing to help them.

Has your work changed your life or your relations with your family and friends?

My work had a significant effect on my life. I was married and was forced to divorce because I couldn’t continue with my work while I was married. My work had a negative effect on my wife even though she used to work with me. Today, I think that I will be forced to marry from outside Nablus, because I will not find the woman I want in Nablus. The reason for this is that the community doesn’t accept my work. The community is afraid of my work with the Israelis.

Is it rare in your community for people to do work like yours?

80% of the people who work with me prefer to keep the nature of their work secret, because they are afraid of the reactions of the community.46 Our board of directors consists of seven people, but only three are known to work with us and four are afraid to admit the nature of their work. Many Palestinians who participate in meetings with the Israelis are afraid to admit it.

Are there other organizations in Nablus that do similar work to yours?

No. There are no organizations that I know of in Nablus, Jenin or Tulkarm47 which are the main cities in the northern West Bank, and the areas which are most affected by the conflict, that do similar work.

Do you feel that your sense of belonging has changed?

I feel that I totally belong to the Palestinian people. I don’t feel that I belong to any political organization. I feel that I only belong to the Nablus Youth Federation that represents a certain idea, an idea that is impossible for the people to believe in.

Do you feel that your sense of belonging has changed?

I feel that I totally belong to the Palestinian people. I don’t feel that I belong to any political organization. I feel that I only belong to the Nablus Youth Federation that represents a certain idea, the idea of dialogue as a means of achieving the end of occupation, which is an idea that is impossible for the people to believe in.

Which part of the conflict had the biggest effect on you?

I think that the part of the conflict that hadthe biggest influence on me are the checkpoints48 and the humiliations that they cause. Having to wait for two hours at a checkpoint is very hard for me. It is hard for me to be left stranded at the checkpoint and not know why. The only alleged explanation for this is that it is being done for security reasons.

What do you personally gain from your work?

I feel that I serve the interest of the Palestinians. I am convinced of the importance of the work I do. I am one of about 70-80 people who are totally convinced that our policy is the right one, even if we must die for it. We are determined to lay the first brick in the foundations of Palestinian thought. During 55 years of occupation, nobody has laid the foundation for Palestinian thought. The mental struggle is harder than the physical struggle. When we plan a summer camp for 500 children, 500 children attend. When we plan a concert for 3000 people, 3000 people show up. We have never planned to have a certain number of people attend an activity and not reach it. I think that the people are afraid of the current situation. They are afraid of the reactions and criticism of the community. Despite all this, and the assassination of Rantisi, there are student meetings in Nablus and sessions for trainers. The people are afraid and don’t have the courage to speak out. They are afraid of the PA and of the resistance factions. The PA isn’t capable of protecting anyone but also, no one can stop the PA if it holds a participant in our meetings for interrogation about what we do, why we do it and so on.

There is no justification for the PA not providing the Federation with an official license. The PA says that they don’t regard the work of the Federation as being problematic, but they don’t want to grant us a license. How is this possible? I want to tell you something funny: the Americans, the Europeans and the Japanese fund joint Israeli- Palestinian activities. The funding can reach half a million dollars, but the money has to go through the Israeli organization. But when we ask for funding for inter-Palestinian activities, such as a summer camp or a youth leadership course, they refuse and claim that we don’t have a license. When we apply for a license from the PA they demand that we stop working with the Israelis or conceal our work and not perform it in the open. All this is a show, and nobody knows who the main actor is. Today there are 90 organizations that all have relations with Israel and don’t receive independent funding, whereas arbitrarily there are others whose budgets could reach half a million dollars and the PA as well as the funding bodies know about them. When it comes to a Palestinian organization trying to fundraise, they are immediately refused for not having a license. Sponsors tell us that they have transferred money to the Israelis and they in turn are supposed to transfer it to us because we do not have a license and this is according to PA regulations. But the PA should have been clear from the beginning if they didn’t want us to work in this field, they should have told funding organizations that they shouldn’t work with organizations that are not licensed. In Israel, it is the Ministry of Interior that is responsible for the licensing issue, but in the PA, the Ministry of Youth and Sports is involved and the Ministry of Interior, as well as the new ministry that they came up with: the Ministry of Non-Governmental Mediators.49 I mean, it’s a mess, and you don’t know who’s in charge of what. We hired four lawyers to help us get a license, but the PA keeps telling us that there is no law in the Palestinian Legislative Council for licensing an organization that calls for Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. Another problem is the bureaucracy inside the PA. Unfortunately we would have to turn to X or Y persons in the PA to push our papers; and then they talk about democracy and idealism!

What do you consider a small victory?

I consider holding a meeting with Israelis a victory. A bigger victory is achieved when we succeed in convincing Israelis that only through peace will they be able to achieve security. They shouldn’t think that there can be security without peace. I mean, as they can see we were able to come and attend the meetings here at Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam even without permits. So if a Palestinian is able to reach Israel for peaceful purposes, they will also be able to reach Israel for harmful purposes. That is why I think the millions of dollars spent on the separation wall50 is a waste, because no matter what, we will find a way. I mean, look at us now, we are a group of thirty people that got out of Nablus without permits to get here,51 we didn’t care if we had to climb mountains for hours. We had to reach them. They need to know that the security that the checkpoints provide is an illusion because if someone wants to carry out an operation and blow himself up, he will find a way. Telling that to university students is a victory for me because they still don’t fully understand it.

What inspires you?

It has become like the blood that runs in my veins, it is part of me. I became addicted; I aim to improve myself every day. I don’t have a problem with working 18 hours a day. To be honest, I discovered myself through this work. I am addicted to this work. It is similar to a policeman that develops a habit of stopping people for minor offenses and giving them creative punishments, or a cook that cooks tasty food and pleases the customers. We want to publish a CD about the incursion into Nablus so that the world can see what happened there. During a meeting I attended in France, an Israeli walked out and said that he was ashamed of being a Zionist. This declaration alone was more important for me than the whole meeting. For me this is better than anything I could hope for.

Have you met people during your work that you wouldn’t have otherwise?

In every meeting I meet about 30 new people. During some activities I meet 120 new people and I sometimes meet up to 500 people during different activities. You meet new people every day while trying to convince the other side of your views.

Has your work put you in situations that you wouldn’t have been involved in otherwise?

No. This work is in my blood. I learned many things while performing this work. I don’t have an academic degree, but today I have an equivalent of a PhD as a result of my work. I have comprehensive experience in planning and executing this kind of work. I think that I learned more things from my work than I would have learned in university. I learn new things from my work and develop every day.

Has a conversation with a person ever changed your positions?

In my opinion there is a difference, which I respect myself for knowing, between theory and implementation. There is a difference between spreading slogans and changing the reality on the ground. One example is calling those meetings an act of normalization,52 but is the problem that Palestinians don’t have relations with Israelis? It doesn’t make sense because Palestinian workers work inside Israel; Israeli cellular companies earn millions of shekels every month from phone card sales in the West Bank. Our food is Israeli, our water and electricity too, so why do you accuse us of normalization? If you want to be so patriotic, then stop filling your car with fuel because by paying for it, you’ll be paying taxes that will go to the Israelis and then go to the army. Even Palestinian phone companies take all their lines from an Israeli company. Our wheat and rice come from Haifa,53 and the port belongs to Israel, so even the clothes you wear have to come through Israel, and there again you have to pay taxes. So why do we keep talking about normalization? We have to be realistic. I think there is a difference between theory and practice. There is a difference between spreading slogans and changing the reality on the ground. I think that the people who are against normalization and call for a boycott on all Israeli products are misleading themselves and the Palestinian people. This is because most of the goods that are available for the Palestinians are Israeli goods. The taxes we pay reach the hands of the Israelis who in turn invest the money in the army. We can’t do anything about this. Therefore the talk of boycotting Israeli products as a means of struggle is misleading and ineffective.

What have you learned about yourself or generally from your work?

I learned that determination is the key to success. When I am convinced that I should do something and am determined to do so, nothing can stop me. I received many threats as a result of my work. I reply by saying, “Kill me but don’t paralyze me, don’t make me a burden on my family.” I am totally convinced of what I do. I fear nothing.

What is the most important thing that needs to be achieved for your country and people?

The most important thing for us is to know were we stand and what our situation is, and to know where we want to head in the future. When Israel decided to pull out from Gaza,54 all the Palestinian groups met to decide how to react. There are more important things than this. There is no strategic coordination between the Palestinians, and there is no strategic planning for the future of Palestine. It is the Palestinian people who pay the price. This is clear. There is no dialogue between the Palestinians.

What does it take to get there?

We need to work. Everyone needs to work.

What does the word peace mean for you?

The word peace is a big word. The word peace can mean the safety of oneself or the safety of the family among a community. Peace could mean the future. It has many meanings. Peace can mean the land, the homeland, it could mean the ending of the conflict. I think there is a conflict inside every person between good and evil. For me, personally, it means the ability to protect myself.

Do you expect peace in the near future?

I think there will be no peace without popular demand for change on both sides. These joint meetings are what will move the two peoples and encourage them to reach an agreement. If there are meetings there is hope. The Federation holds monthly meetings that are attended by 100 people, but this is not enough, even on the level of Nablus.

What depresses you?

Palestinians who do not see beyond their noses, and how to deal with them depress me. I will give you a simple example: there was a certain period in which the people were in need of aid in the form of food and essentials. When the aid was provided, the people started to compete and argue amongst themselves over the distribution of the aid, to the extent that the effort lost its meaning. There is no strategic Palestinian plan for meeting the needs of the people. When Bush declared that the refugees would not return to their land, no Palestinian official stood up and said that Bush has no right to say that. Bush gave Sharon a permit to treat Arafat as he wishes. The Palestinian officials should have a voice and influence regarding these issues. They only keep calling for the continuation of the resistance. Abu Ala only brought up the issue of the wall a year and a half after they started building it, and it turned out that the cement came from his factory!55 Those are facts that I even told Abu Ala in his face. I told him that he is deceiving us and the people are the ones paying the price for that act.

Who are the most important people that should know about your work?

The people on the outside. All the foreigners, and they need to hear it from Israelis because the Israelis themselves are surprised by a lot of things they see and hear from us.

Which international audiences have the most influence on the conflict?

Nobody. I don’t think anyone affects the situation here. I will give you an example. There is a group of Palestinians and Israelis that are planning to meet in Europe. The Israelis reach the airport in two hours, and after a few hours on the plane they reach Europe. The Palestinians are forced to wake up at four in the morning. They reach the checkpoint in Hawara at seven or eight o’clock. When they reach the border crossing in Jericho they are searched by the Palestinian police who pass them on to the Israelis. The Israelis decide who can cross into Jordan and who can’t. You can do nothing without Israeli approval -- it is beyond our control. The Jordanians may also refuse your entrance, as one now needs a permit to enter Jordan.56 The whole journey will take you about 48 hours, while it takes the Israelis only a few hours. It is the same on the return trip. I think this issue alone could be the content of the whole meeting. Israelis are very strict when it comes to security issues, and even the Israelis with whom we meet can’t help us with this problem.

What is the biggest misconception among foreigners regarding the conflict?

The biggest misconception is that the world thinks that the conflict is between two countries. They don’t know that the conflict is between a strong country and a people. They don’t know about the checkpoints. When the world talks about a ceasefire between the two sides they don’t know what they are talking about. The conflict is between a great power and a disempowered people. The Palestinian media is absent, and the Palestinian officials are only strengthening this misunderstanding when they talk about a ceasefire between the two sides. It doesn’t make sense.

What is the biggest misconception about your work?

We are accused of many things such as normalization, adversely influencing youth, and working against our national interests. Our reaction to these accusations is clear. There are many Palestinian organizations that refuse to work with us and try to undermine us. We are sometimes forced to conceal our work in order to prevent it from being disrupted.

In your opinion, what are the roots of the conflict?

The occupation of one people by another. There is no debate about this.

Do you think fear has an effect on the conflict?

Fear is a basic component in the conflict. If a Palestinian worker is arrested in Jerusalem it will take two weeks to get out of prison after going through all the procedures.

Do you think fear drives the two sides to hold joint meetings?

I think that what drives people to hold joint meetings is desperation. People are desperate about the situation and have reached the conclusion that there should be a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This is clear from the participants in the meetings. Every participant comes from a different situation.

Do you think the Palestinians and the Israelis share the same fears?

I think that every side has its own fears. Palestinians don’t fear violence and arrests. Israelis are very afraid of suicide bombings. Many Palestinians don’t fear death, because they don’t feel they are alive anyway.

You said before that you used to work with other Israeli organizations other than Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam. Why did you stop?

Because they didn’t have a political position. We are in the midst of a bloody conflict. We should have a basis for joint meetings. The basis can be for example the issue of the refugees or Jerusalem. We are not willing to meet with Israelis only so that the world can come and see that we are meeting with Israelis. We didn’t have a basis for our joint work. I had disputes with some organizations. When the intifada began, many organizations that worked with the Palestinians before the uprising cut all relations with them. There are some Israeli organizations that used the joint meetings as a business. They used to use the Palestinians as a way of making money. They used to receive millions of dollars of funding for joint activities with the Palestinians. They organized meetings that didn’t achieve anything. Today if we want to have an event, we do it in Nablus. If the Israelis are interested in the Palestinians and want to work with them they should come to Nablus. Why spend all the money on your hotels and give your people something to do, why not have it in Nablus? Some Israeli organizations claimed to be working at preparing a future Palestinian leadership. They aren’t preparing leadership; they are using the Palestinians as a means to get money so that they can improve their financial situation.

Will there be more meetings in the future?

We will continue the joint meetings, and we hope to be the first to establish a blueprint for Israeli Palestinian meetings and cooperation. Sari Nusseibeh doesn’t represent anything for me. This is for a simple reason: we don’t have the right to sign an agreement with Israel regarding the right of return of the refugees. The Geneva Accord57 was signed between Israelis and Palestinians. With all due respect to the Geneva agreement, it was translated into four languages, Arabic, Russian, English, and Hebrew and distributed by the Israeli side to every home in Israel but the Palestinian side didn’t distribute it because it is ashamed of it. They were ashamed to publish the agreement in the media. How can you sign an agreement you are ashamed of?

You say that the Palestinian people are ashamed of the Geneva Accord, yet members of the PA were part of the initiative --

Right. Is there a Palestinian who hasn’t heard of the Geneva Accord? But still, those who were involved in signing it didn’t present the agreement clearly to the Palestinian people. I think an agreement that concerns the Palestinian people should reach and be accessible to every Palestinian, at least inside Palestine. The agreement was published on the internet. But there is a difference between displaying the agreement on the internet and bringing it directly to the people. This is a weakness in planning and in the ability to face the people. We can’t concede any rights of the Palestinian refugees during an agreement with Israel. All the refugees have the right to return to where they want.

What do you think is the solution?

The solution is that the refugees return home.

How do you think that could ideally be done?

We have five million refugees. Half of them may want to return and the other half may not. The half that returns is free to return to wherever they want, to the 1967 territories or the lands of 1948. This issue needs to be discussed internally by the Palestinians.

What other issues do you view as being problematic?

The issue of the prisoners. I will give you an example. The PA wasn’t able to free Ahmad Yassin, but he was freed in return for Israeli agents that were captured during an attempt to assassinate Khaled Meshaal.58 Israel freed Palestinian prisoners in return for Israeli prisoners that were held by Hezbollah.59 There is no serious Palestinian effort to release the prisoners. The Palestinian ministers only care about having a good job with good pay. I think that a self-respecting person is a person who cares for their people. These issues need to be discussed by the Palestinians. These issues aren’t simple. I think that Peres is more dangerous for the Palestinians than Sharon. Sharon is clear; he doesn’t want peace.

Can you elaborate?

It is clear that Sharon doesn’t want peace. He wants to continue oppressing the Palestinians. Peres claims that he wants peace, but at the same time continues oppressing the Palestinians. Peres agreed with the Palestinians about a withdrawal from Hebron,60 but didn’t execute it. Netanyahu61 signed the same agreement and executed it. I think that peace will be achieved only with the Israeli right, not the left. The left is fearful. This is a political fact that I am totally convinced of. Sharon will withdraw from Gaza62 and evacuate settlements,63 but this will only happen when there is no more Palestinian leadership. The Palestinian leadership is dead anyway, mainly internally.

How have the changes in the situation affected you work?

I think public opinion is volatile. We are undergoing the most important stage that the Palestinians have ever gone through. This is the stage of democracy and we should be aware of our situation. We want a Palestinian state, but we don’t have an internal agreement about the nature of this state. I will give you a simple example. It was decided that voters in the elections would be registered. The decision was then changed to be civil registration. In the last two hours it was decided that it was enough to register using a personal identification document. Decisions that take two months to decide upon in Washington take an hour in Palestine. I think the democratic elections contained an element of humor. Most people registered for the election two months in advance, but the members of the organizations didn’t register because they weren’t coordinated. We can’t know what the next stage will be and how to set our agenda for the next stage.

Follow up interview November 2005

Could you tell us what has changed during this year?

Many things have changed. In 2004 we had more work. During this year we held 20 activities, 16 of which were Palestinian-Israeli meetings. This is the first year we have an active website. Many things have changed since we talked in March. Things that are correct today may be wrong tomorrow, and vise versa. During our work in 2004 in the West Bank, especially in the area of Ramallah64 and Bethlehem,65 I felt that there has been a change from within the Palestinian society. There is a difference in the way people from Nablus and people from Ramallah view the conflict for example. There is also a difference in education and the customs and culture. There is even a difference in political views. The people from the north are more aware of the situation than the people from the south. This is because the people from the north suffer more from the situation. This causes people from Nablus to have a broader view of the situation than the people from Ramallah. The most important experience for me was the journey to Germany from the 31st of June to the 17th of August last year. During this trip, which was taken by Palestinian students from across the West Bank, I sensed a big difference between people who come from different areas of the West Bank. I felt the importance of internal Palestinian dialogue as there was an internal struggle among the Palestinian group. I think we are not here merely to ask for the removal of the checkpoints but for the removal of the occupation as a whole. Checkpoints are only a byproduct of occupation. I recognized that there are people who seek an immediate and partial solution, and there are people who seek a more thorough and comprehensive solution. These issues are now clearer for me. After the death of President Arafat everything has changed, even my point of view. Arafat managed to achieve five years of peace, followed by five years of war. For every peaceful year for the Palestinians, there are more bloody years. I don’t think that Abu Mazen has a magic solution for the situation. I think that if Abu Mazen achieves one year of calm, it will be followed by ten bloody years. This is inevitable. I think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is developing and going through several stages.

Developing how?

I think the conflict and the Palestinian cause are developing for the best. I think there are two main voices in Palestinian society. One voice aims to talk to the Israelis and to the world, and the other uses violence in order to achieve its goals. I think these two voices complete each other. You can’t call upon people to discuss peace while the checkpoints are still intact and the Israeli violence continues. But we can stop or tone down the resistance so that we can have achievements. Palestinian society consists of two prominent voices and is developing. On a local level, the people of the city of Nablus have now accepted the Nablus Youth Federation and its activities. The participants in our activities used to refuse to put their pictures or names on our website, but today most people don’t mind. I am convinced that this is a new and extremely advanced stage in the struggle. In 1987, the Palestinians began their resistance by throwing stones; today we have Qassam rockets.66 Another issue is that during the first intifada there were 1700 martyrs67 and 12 Israeli deaths. In this intifada we have nearly 4000 Palestinian martyrs and about 1000 Israelis killed. The ratio of casualties is balancing out. If previously Palestinian military operations were carried out by a single fighter, now they are carried out by 20. Golda Meir68 said that there is no Palestinian people, but the Palestinian people have since proven their existence.

A Palestinian might spend four months digging a tunnel, whereas someone else would not dig that much even if there was a treasure buried underneath; Palestinians just want their state. Another Palestinian on the other hand, walks for eight hours on foot to reach a meeting with Israelis even if the Israeli government doesn’t allow him, that one ,too, wants a state. The two streams use different methods but share the same goal. An issue that is more important is democratic elections in the West Bank and Gaza.69 Those who didn’t vote, abstained as an act of democratic resistance. There where no problems or violent incidents during the elections, contrary to the expectations of the world. Despite the situation, a third voice was created, the Voice of the National Initiative, led by Mustafa Barghouthi70 and obtained 19% of the votes. They managed to achieve this in two years. If they work for 40 years, like the Fatah71 movement, they will overtake the Fatah movement easily. Fatah is satisfied with the 62% they achieved in the elections. If the Islamic parties hadn’t boycotted the elections, Fatah would have lost. I think that the period of dictatorship that we lived in under the time of Arafat has ended, officially. Today one can openly declare their opposition to Fatah. They may be shot at, but that is much less likely than in the past.

Abu Mazen is supported by only about 25% of the Palestinian people,72 if we consider that only half the Palestinian took part in the elections. 62% of 50% is about 25%. The empire that Fatah claims itself to be has ended. This is an indicator of the degree of awareness of the Palestinian people. I think the PLO73 has lost its place in the Palestinian society. The aim of my work is to achieve a fair and comprehensive peace, and to build a civil society. I think that Fatah isn’t a single united organization. There are 13 groups that claim to be part of Fatah, and every group considers itself to be responsible for the situation and in control. Abu Mazen says that the most important thing for him is the security of the citizens. But who are the ones shooting on the street? I can only identify with a political group that has a clear political position and clear basis for decision-making, therefore I can’t identify with the Fatah movement because they have many different political positions and decision-makers. Everybody in Fatah does as they wish; Fatah members in different areas do what they want and don’t work according to a coordinated strategy. An example of this is what happened between Abu Mazen and Marwan Barghouti.74 They are both Fatah members but both of them wanted to be candidates for presidency during the last election. I identify with civil society and with people that work within Palestinian civil society. There are members of Fatah that voted in the elections for Mustafa Barghouti. This is why, we, the Nablus Youth Federation, will never view ourselves as a part of Fatah.

What is your agenda for the next stage?

My agenda is to support all forms of the resistance to the occupation, and at the same time to maintain the political struggle.

What do you consider to be resistance?

Resistance in all its forms. While there is occupation there will be resistance. This is the opinion of our organization and my personal opinion.

What in your opinion are the forms of resistance?

This resistance includes military resistance. As long as there is occupation there will be resistance. We are the occupied people. I find it strange when people talk about a ceasefire. We are a people that is fighting a strong state.

People may find it strange that you hold joint meetings and dialogue with Israelis and at the same time support military resistance.

When we took the strategic decision to meet and have a dialogue with the Israelis, it was a decision to create a new strategy that completes the strategy of armed resistance, it was not meant to replace the existing strategy of resistance. For example, on the day of the elections, the EU and the United States promised 72 hours of Israeli withdrawal to make the election process run smoother, but we didn’t even have one hour of that! We can’t call upon people to stop the resistance while there is still occupation and the construction of the wall confiscates thousands of acres of land every day. The resistance will continue as long as the occupation continues. I support the resistance and am convinced that the more they receive blows, the more the Israelis are committed to joint meetings. When there is a smell of a solution in the air, the Israelis stop initiating, sit back and wait to see what will happen and stop demonstrating and trying to influence the situation and depend on the leadership to reach an agreement. I think that this is the period of calm before the storm.

An important issue is that the people didn’t demonstrate against Arafat, but they will demonstrate against Abu Mazen. The people will say no to Abu Mazen. Nobody can say that Abu Mazen sold out on the Palestinian issue, but there are other obvious issues. The people are aware of the situation and know what is happening. Members of the PA say that they are fighting corruption within the PA, but they are the PA. Do they want to fight themselves?

Can you see this happening?

Never. If you see that a poster for the election campaign -- it is worth $10,000 while people don’t have money to buy food. Nothing is being done about it -- you would be lying when you say that you are fighting the corruption. There are many issues that concern our current situation that we should think about.

Follow up interview conducted in January 2005

You say that you believe that armed resistance is important as is dialogue, what do the Israelis you work with think when you tell them about your views?

Look, things change over time. I will give you an example: the school for peace in NSWAS held meetings for students calling for peace and opposing the army and so on, but when push came to shove, it turned out that all those were just slogans. I think this is true because Nava, the director of the school has two children that ended up serving in the army in the West Bank. She says that they were only working with computers for the army in the West Bank, but for me that that doesn’t change the fact that they were serving there. I think that the people in the Israeli peace camp right now do not now what peace they want; unless there is pressure inside their society, they hardly take action. As you can see there has been a decrease in the amount of joint meetings lately with the claim that there needs to be more focus on internal issues within each society separately.

Can you ellaborate on how you oppose a soldier joining the army, considering it a violent activity even when working with computers, and at the same time think that armed resistance complements negotiations ?

I still think that armed resistance is what will lead to our founding a state, one example is what happened in Gaza; the PA could have gone on negotiating for ten years, Israel would still not pull out. It was obvious that Hamas was winning the local councils elections, so it’s becoming more popular, but when it came to opening the Rafah crossing, the PA had to negotiate, so you see the base is armed resistance and negotiation completes it.

What exactly do you mean by pressure inside the Israeli society?

Like when there is a military operation inside Israel, that causes a state of discomfort for them, it disturbs the tranquility of their lives so they start to look for Palestinians to meet with. Look at how many demonstrations there were against the wall during 2003 and 2004, but now those are slowing down a lot. That’s why we have published a statement about what is our understanding of peace and its terms. Sometimes I feel like some Israeli organizations use the Palestinian partners as Kleenex or Always and dispose them when they're not usable anymore. When they used to hear about an incursion or shootings they used to immediately call and check on us, but now they don't do that because there is no urgency for it.

Do you consider a soldier working with computers the same as an armed fighter?

Yes, you know why? I am under occupation, I am the aggressed against and not the aggressor. The other thing is that computers are also used to direct missiles that strike homes and people and then they claim “sorry, it was by mistake.” I am opposed to a soldier doing anything in the West Bank. When I said yes to peace, I gave up the historical Palestine for its [peace’s] sake. When I agreed to have the Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, I had already agreed to have only %22 percent of the historical Palestine. What else am I expected to give up? I don’t have a problem with soldiers serving inside Israel, but I have a problem with working for peace while the people I work with [Israelis] are OK with having soldiers in the West Bank.

Earlier you said that Zionism controls the media, do you think that is a stereotype?

I’ll give you an example: even when journalists come here they don’t have problems going into cities inside Israel, but then think a thousand times before going into Nablus or Jenin or Tulkarem because they are part of a society that is media oriented and what they hear there is that there is a possibility they might get kidnapped or hurt, so they become afraid. I think that kidnapping a foreign journalist is a savage act. Most of the satellite channels take their footage from Aljazeera or Al Arabiya because they go inside Gaza and the West Bank but the latter don’t. Unconsciously one sympathizes with Israelis if this is the notion about what Palestinians are like.

End.



Notes

We have done our best to provide accurate, fair yet succinct footnotes to help you navigate the interviews. Our research team comprises more than 6 individuals, including Palestinians, Israelis and North Americans. Still, we recognize that these notes cannot capture the full complexity of this contested conflict. Therefore, we encourage you to seek additional sources of information, we welcome your feedback and appreciate your openness.

Nablus A Palestinian city in the northern West Bank. Est. population 132,000.

Nablus Youth Federation A Palestinian youth organization based in Nablus. The organization engages in interfaith work between Muslim, Christian and Samaritan residents of Nablus, as well as interfaith meetings in Israel between Muslims, Christians, Jews and Samaritans in cooperation with the Interfaith Encounter Association.

Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel Also known as “Palestinian citizens of Israel,” “Palestinian Israelis,” “1948 Palestinians,” or “Arab Israelis.” Refers to those Palestinians and their descendents who remained in the area that became the State of Israel in 1948. They were granted Israeli citizenship. Until 1966 most of them were subjected to military rule that restricted their movement and some of their rights. The tension in Israel between its “Jewish” and “democratic” nature has historically meant that many Arab minority rights have been neglected. According to Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, since 1967, “The state [has] practiced systematic and institutionalized discrimination in all areas, such as land dispossession and allocation, education, language, economics, culture, and political participation.” While their standing in Israel has improved since Israel’s independence, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel experience periodic persecution, felt strongest during the October 2000 riots in which 13 Palestinian Arab Israelis were killed in ten days. In 2004, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel made up approximately 18-19% of the Israeli population. They live within the State of Israel, participate in government and hold Israeli citizenship, but do not serve in the military. See Lustick, Ian S. “Palestinian Citizens of Israel.” Philip Mattar, ed. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005 and Bligh, Alexander, ed. The Israeli Palestinians: an Arab Minority in the Jewish State. London: Frank Cass, 2003. See also Adala and Mossawa online at http://www.adalah.org/eng/ and http://www.mossawacenter.org

Samaritans (in Hebrew “Shomronim”), a distinct religious and ethnic community who believe in a form of ancient Israelite religion distinct from Judaism. While, like the Jews, the Samaritans consider the Five Books of Moses the word of God and their sacred scripture, they reject the remainder of Judaic scripture. The Samaritans consider Mt. Gerizim, located in the West Bank town of Nablus, their holiest site. There are approximately 600 Samaritans in Israel and the West Bank today—about half living in Nablus and the other half in the town of Holon, outside of Tel Aviv. For more information on the Samaritans see The Samaritans. 21 Sept 2006. The Samaritans. 9 November 2007 http://www.the-samaritans.com/

Ghassan Shak`a (Ghassan Walid Ahmad Shak`a) was appointed mayor of Nablus by the Palestinian Authority in October 1994. He is a member of the PLO-EC, and the PLC member for Nablus (Fatah).He received an LLB degree in Beirut in 1971 and is a lawyer by profession. He is a member of the Palestinian Authority`s High Council for Refugee Camps, established in 1997. He is a cousin of Bassam Shak`a, who was also mayor of Nablus. http://www.geruva.com/cgi-bin/mei/who.cgi?topic_description=Shak%60a,+Ghassan

The Interfaith Encounter Organization (IEA) is an organization "dedicated to promoting peace in the Middle East through interfaith dialogue and cross-cultural study." See the Interfaith Encounter Organization website at http://www.interfaith-encounter.org/.

Second Intifada Arabic for “shaking off.” The second intifada is sometimes called the Al-Aqsa (Aksa or ‘Aqsa) Intifada or the Armed Intifada. It refers to the recent Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The second intifada began in September 2000 following the breakdown of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and immediately following Ariel Sharon’s (then, an Israeli opposition leader) police escorted visit to the Temple Mount/ Haram al-Sharif. Sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and their holy sites (including the al-Aqsa mosque). Sharon was highlighting a major point of contention in negotiations as both Jews and Muslims greatly revere the area. There is debate as to whether the second intifada was a spontaneous uprising catalyzed by Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, or a planned revolt by certain Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat. Unlike the first intifada, the second intifada involved suicide bombings and more use of arms, in addition to mass rallies, general strikes and various other strategies. The exact end date of the second intifada is ambiguous. Some claim it is ongoing. See also First Intifada. See Hartley, Cathy, ed. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, 2nd ed. London and New York: Europa Publications, 2004. See online “The second Intifada.” 8 December 2003. AlJazeera.net. November 2007 http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=187 and “Al-Aqsa Intifada timeline.” 29 Sept 2004. BBC News Online. 9 November 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm

The Israeli Army led a major incursion into (and later laid siege to) the West Bank town of Nablus for approximately 15 days in April of 2002. The main hospital in Nablus confirmed 75 Palestinian dead and over 200 wounded. One Israeli soldier died and nine were wounded during the incursion and siege. See C.J. Chivers. "Mideast Turmoil: Nablus; Israeli Army Withdraws from a City in Ruins," The New York Times, 21 Apr 2002, A11.

Right of Return International law enshrines the right of a person to leave and return to his or her country. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Right of Return has two controversial connotations: For the descendants of the 700,000-800,000 Palestinians who became refugees during the period of the creation of the State of Israel, as well as for the Palestinian refugees from the war in 1967, the Right of Return refers to their right to return to their pre-1948 and/or pre-1967 homes and lands and—should they freely choose not to return home—to receive compensation. UN General Assembly Resolution 194 affirms this right but is yet to be implemented. By contrast, under the Israeli Law of Return, the right of return refers to the right of Jews worldwide as well as their descendants, to receive Israeli citizenship and to live as full citizens in the land of Israel. The Law of Return was meant to facilitate the ingathering of Jews worldwide and to fulfill the Zionist aim of creating a refuge in the State of Israel for Jews fleeing persecution and anti-Semitism. For documents relating to the right of return for Palestinian refugees see “Israel, Palestine and the Occupied Territories…” Global Policy Forum. 19 October 2007 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/returnindex.htm. For a text of Israeli Law of Return and its amendments see “Law of Return: 5710-1950” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 October 2007 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law+of+Return+5710-1950.htm

Jerusalem Known as Al Quds (“The Holy”) in Arabic and Yerushalayim or Zion in Hebrew. A city located in the center of both Israel and the West Bank portion of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Home to approximately 730,000 people from all three monotheistic religions, as well as sacred sites from these faiths within close proximity, including the Western Wall, the al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The Green Line, or the 1949 cease-fire line between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, demarcates the unofficial boundary between Israel and the West Bank, and divides Jerusalem. Israel immediately declared Jerusalem as its capital in 1948, and enshrined this in its Basic Laws in 1980. Palestinians aspire to declare Jerusalem as the capital of a nascent Palestine. Following the War of 1967, Israel extended its sovereignty to the Eastern half of the city, including the Old City and the holy shrines, which were controlled by Jordan from 1948. Israel “unified” East and West Jerusalem in its 1980 “Jerusalem Law”, leaving borders undefined. Most countries do not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the entire city, an opinion codified in UN Security Council Resolution 478. Rather, they regard Jerusalem’s status as undetermined, pending final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. See: “Jerusalem” Kumaraswamy, P.R. Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2006. To read the text of the 1980 Basic Law see Basic Law-Jerusalem-Capital of Israel. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 June 2007.

1967 Borders Refers to the borders of Israel with Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria prior to the War of 1967. The war is referred to by Palestinians and Arabs as the “June War” and by Israelis as the “1967 War” or the “Six-Day War” on account of its duration. Israel captured the Egyptian Sinai, the Syrian Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, then under respective Jordanian and Egyptian control. See also War of 1967 and Green Line.

Gaza Strip Geographical territory located on the Mediterranean Coast and bordering the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Israel, with a total land mass of 360 sq km. Population: 1,482,405. The Palestinian populated territory was under Israeli administrative and military occupation from 1967 to 1994, when an agreement pursuant to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) gave the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) limited self-government for an interim five-year period, although Israel retained responsibility for external and internal security and for public order of settlements. Until August 2005, approximately 8000 Israeli settlers lived in the Strip. Negotiations aimed at determining final status of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza commenced in 1999, but failed to accomplish their objectives by the second intifada in September 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan to withdraw all permanent military and security structures and dismantle all settlements within the Gaza Strip and return the territory to PNA control was completed in September 2005, although Israel maintains control over air space, and land and sea borders and continues to launch military operations within Gaza. See “Gaza Strip.” CIA. 14 June 2007. The World Factbook. 19 June 2007

Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994.

Neve Shalom/Wahat al Salam Hebrew and Arabic for Oasis of Peace. A village in Israel bteween Jerusalem and Tel Aviv established jointly by Jews and Palestinian Arabs of Israeli citizenship, with the goal of engaging in "educational work for peace, equality and understanding between the two peoples." Fifty families currently live there.

The School for Peace An educational affiliate of NSWAS. The School for Peace offers seminars and workshops with the goal of increasing the participants' (i.e., Jews and Arabs) awareness of the conflict as well as their role in it. Additionally, it hopes to "enable them to probe and construct their identity through interaction with the other" in an effort to strive toward a more just and egalitarian society. See the School for Peace website at http://www.sfpeace.org/.

Zochrot (Hebrew meaning "remembering") is an Israeli organization that holds demonstrations, protests, erects signs and creates makeshift memorials to commemorate Palestinian villages destroyed during the 1948 War. See

Palestinian Authority Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Also known as the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA was created to serve as the governing body in charge of Palestinian self-rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as part of the Oslo process. While the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed on to the Oslo peace process in 1993, it has since seen its leadership absorbed into the PA, pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement. As leader of the PLO, Arafat became the PA Chairman in 1994. The Palestinian Authority is the first governing body of the Palestinian people by Palestinians. Its authority was significantly curtailed by the content of the agreements signed with Israel during the Oslo Process, giving it full jurisdiction over only a small proportion of the West Bank (see “Areas A, B and C” in glossary). It consists of a legislative Council and its President, including 24 ministries. Mahmoud Abbas was appointed President of the PA in April 2003, was replaced by Ahmed Qurei months later, and was elected in 2005. The PA has observer status in the United Nations. See Parsons, Nigel. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority. New York: Routledge, 2005 and Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003. See online “Palestinian National Authority.” Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. 11 September 2007 http://www.un.int/palestine/thepa.shtml

Occupation The “Occupation” is used to refer to Israel’s military control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. It may also refer to Israel’s occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, although the territory was annexed by Israel in 1981. International legal bodies do not recognize the annexation. See “Occupied Palestinian Territories.”

First Intifada Arabic for “shaking off.” The term “intifada” is used to refer to uprisings, especially during times of widespread Palestinian revolts against Israel. While some scholars consider the 1936-39 Palestinian uprising as the first intifada, the first intifada (1987-1993) usually refers to the popular uprising whereby Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose up against Israeli military rule through a coordinated movement involving multiple sectors of Palestinian society. Actions included mass rallies, general strikes, unarmed and stone-throwing confrontations, the use of Molotov cocktails and limited arms against the Israeli army, combined with self-administration of daily life and attempts at nonviolent civil disobedience. The Israeli military was unable to quash the rebellion, although they implemented a harsh “Force, Might and Beatings” policy under Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, involving widespread arrests, detention and reports of torture. This intifada came to an end when Israel entered into negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization and co-launched the Oslo Peace Process. See King, Mary Elizabeth. A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance. New York: Nation Books, 2007 and Farsoun, Samih K. and Naseer H. Aruri. Palestine and the Palestinians, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2006. See online “The Intifada.” MERIP. 25 June 2007 http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/intifada-87-pal-isr-primer.html and “Intifada.” MSN Encarta Online. 25 June 2007 http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761579974/Intifada.html

In early April of 2004, the Israeli Army led an incursion into portions of the West Bank and Gaza killing four Palestinians. The Israeli Army arrested 26 during the incursion and raid into Nablus, which lasted about 2 days. See Margaret Dudkevitch. "26 Arrested in Nablus Raid," The Jerusalem Post, 4 Apr 2004, pg. 2.

Refers to the Hawara military base and detention camp located near the West Bank town of Nablus.

B'Tselem In the image of (Hebrew), a biblical reference to man’s creation in the image of god. Officially known as “The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.” The largest Israeli human rights organization, founded in 1989. See: www.btselem.org

Travel Permits Israeli-issued travel permits are required primarily for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza for travel into Israel, and at times throughout East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. Israelis seeking to travel to Area A regions (land under full civilian and security control of the Palestinian Authority) as delineated by the Oslo Accords, must also receive permits. The policy of obligatory travel permits is part of a more comprehensive restriction of movement imposed on Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territories by the State of Israel. The Israeli government maintains that the measures are necessary for Israel’s security. See “Restrictions on Movement.” B’Tselem. 10 November 2007 http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Index.asp

Oslo Process This process was unveiled with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993, although it was preceded by an exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat and back-channel negotiations by Israeli and Palestinian academics. In those letters, Israel recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. The DOP called for a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on United Nation Resolutions 242 and 338. It also led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA or PNA) as part of the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement. Yasser Arafat became President of the PNA. A series of agreements between the Israeli government and the PNA followed. The agreements are known collectively as the Oslo Accords. The Oslo process was set back with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. After the failure of the Camp David Accords in 2000, it ended with the assumption of the second intifada in September 2000. See Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. Boston: University of Arizona, 2004. See “The Oslo Declaration of Principles.” MidEast Web. 13 September 1993. 11 September 2007 http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm

Occupied Palestinian Territories Also known as the “Territories,” “East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza”, the “Occupied Territories” or as “Judea, Samaria and Gaza.” In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this term generally refers to two non-contiguous territories captured by Israel following the war of 1967 (“June War,” “al-Nakba,” or “Six-Day War”), but does not usually include the Golan Heights. East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza are considered occupied by much of the international community and are treated as such by many international legal instruments. The Territories, or some part of, are slated to be the basis for an independent Palestine. Some members of the Israeli government refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “disputed territory,” while certain right-wing factions in Israel consider the territory an integral part of biblical Israel and thus modern political Israel. See “International Law and ‘Occupied’/ ‘Disputed’ Territory Debate” and “War of 1967.”

Palestine A historical territorial entity that comprises much of present-day Israel and the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. Palestine was among the several former Ottoman Arab territories which were placed under the administration of Great Britain under the Mandates System adopted by the League of Nations. However, under Ottoman rule, the territory of British mandated Palestine was not ruled as one distinctive administrative entity, but was divided between the provinces of Beirut, Damascus and the special administrative unit of Jerusalem. UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947) proposed the partitioning of Palestine into two independent states; one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish. This proposal was not realized as Arab leaders, and other nations who rejected the plan, regarded it as invalid. The State of Israel declared independence in 1948 on part of Palestine. The war that followed led to most of Palestine’s territory being annexed by Israel and sections falling under Egyptian and Jordanian control. While the state of Palestine does not exist today, the term is used by many to refer alternatively to a future Palestinian state in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, or the entire territory of British mandate Palestine. See Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000 and Farsoun, Samih K. and Naseer H. Aruri. Palestine and the Palestinians, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2006. Pappe, Ilan A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge University: 2004)

Zionism The belief that the Jewish people should have a national homeland, and refuge from persecution, in Israel. Supporters of this idea are called Zionists. The Zionist Movement took shape in Europe in the late 1800s with the First Zionist Conference in Basel, Switzerland. The movement advocated the ideology of Zionism, a national liberation ideology of the Jewish people with several strands, foremost being the establishment of a Jewish state within the biblical Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael or Zion). Zionism has many manifestations, from religious to secular, each defining a distinct view of which land should be settled, and how it should be done. See http://www.mideastweb.org/zionism.htm

Refusenik/Conscientious Objectors Soldiers or reservists in the Israeli army who refuse to serve in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Israeli army altogether are commonly known as (and often refer to themselves as) “Refuseniks,” a term that was first applied to Jews who were not allowed to leave the Soviet Union to come to Israel by the Soviet government. For an Israeli to legally avoid military service based on the grounds of conscience or refusal, one must be granted Conscientious Objector (CO) status. Hundreds of Israelis have refused service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories on moral grounds since the outbreak of the second intifada. Israel court martialed about 280 for the decision. Many serve up to 35 days in jail. The Refusenik movement gained popularity after a group of Israeli reserve officers and combat soldiers drafted the Combatant’s Letter in January 2002, outlining their justification for conscientious objection. See Courage to Refuse. 19 October 2007.

West Bank Geographical territory located to the west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. Israel refers to it as “Judea” and “Samaria.” It has been under Israeli military control since 1967, although certain powers and responsibilities were transferred to the Palestinian Authority as part of the Oslo process in the 1990s (see Oslo process and Areas A, B and C). The Palestinian population of the West Bank is approximately 2.5 million, in addition to approximately 270,000 Jewish settlers. The West Bank, along with the Gaza Strip, comprises the Occupied Palestinian Territories. See “West Bank.” 1 November 2007. CIA World Factbook. 10 November 2007 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html

Arafat, Yasser (1929-2004) Founder of Al-Fatah (1958). Regarded as a symbol of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Yasser Arafat served as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization from 1969 to 2004. He oversaw political and guerrilla activities of the PLO first from Jordan, then Lebanon, and later Tunis. In 1996, he became the first Elected President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (also called the Palestinian Authority), a position he held until his death. While initially opposed to the existence of the Israeli state, Arafat altered his stance in the late 1980s and 1990s. In a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in December of 1988, Yasser Arafat stated his willingness to accept Palestinian statehood based on UN Resolution 242 -- a resolution that recognizes the rights of all states to sovereignty. Many viewed this as the beginning of the PLO’s recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist. This followed an era of militant tactics his party employed against Israel throughout the 1970s and 1980s. He launched the Oslo process with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1993, for which he received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 along with Rabin and Shimon Peres. In January 1996, Yasser Arafat was elected the first president of the Palestinian Council governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He became increasingly marginalized by the United States and Israel after the second intifada (2000-present), and was isolated completely from diplomatic relations in 2003. Arafat died on November 11, 2004 in Percy military hospital in Paris. See “Arafat, Yasir.” Philip Mattar, ed. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005. See online Yasser Arafat: 1929-2004. PBS. 21 June 2007

Rabin, Yitzhak (1922–95) Prime Minister from 1974–1977 and 1992–1995. He was the first Prime Minister born in Israel. He served as Chief of Staff during the 1967 war, following years in the military. He was an active member of the Labor Party from 1973. Rabin was also Defense Minister from 1984–1990 during the first intifada, which he sought to crush militarily. His strategy during that period was characterized by the order for “force, might and beatings.” In 1993, in his capacity as Prime Minister, Rabin took steps toward accepting a future Palestinian state by launching the Oslo Process with the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat. The two shared the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize along with Shimon Peres. He later helped broker Israel’s 1994 peace treaty with Jordan. Rabin was assassinated on 4 Nov 1995 by a Jewish extremist. See Gresh, Alain and Dominique Vidal. The New A-Z of the Middle East. New York: IB Tauris, 2004. See online “Yitzhak Rabin.” Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 18 October 2007 http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9062358/Yitzhak-Rabin

Peres, Shimon Prime Minister of Israel from 1984-1986 and 1995-1996. He served as the Foreign Minister of Israel on three occasions (1986-1988; 1992-1995; 2001-2002) and has held a myriad of other ministerial posts, including: Minister of Defense, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Minister of Religious Affairs, to name a few. Along with Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, Peres received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 for his role in the signing of the Oslo Accords. He later established the Peres Center for Peace to further the peace process through economic and social cooperation with the Palestinians in 1996. A long-time leading member of the Labor Party, Peres has served in the 4th through 16th Knesset. In December of 2005, Peres left the Labor Party in support of Kadima (“forward” in English), the new political party formed by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. On 13 June 2007, Peres was elected the ninth President of the State of Israel. For a brief biography see “President Shimon Peres” The President of the State of Israel. 11 September 2007 http://www.knesset.gov.il/president/eng/main_eng.htm

Abbas, Mahmoud (1935-) PNA President, also known as Abu Mazen. He has been a leading figure in the Fatah movement (aside from a brief resignation from the Central Committee in 2003) and the PLO since the 1960’s. He has been involved throughout his career in negotiations between Palestinians and the Israeli government, most notably as the leading Palestinian negotiator of the Oslo Accords and as the signatory of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 on behalf of the PLO. The PLO executive committee appointed Abbas as Chairman of the PLO on November 11, 2004, and in January 2005, he was elected President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with 62.7 percent of the popular vote. He maintained that position in the short-lived unity government formed in 2007 as part of the Mecca Agreement. For a brief biography see http://www.passia.org and Fischbach, Michael R. “Abbas, Mahmud.” Philip Mattar, ed. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005.

Qurei, Ahmed (1937-) also known as Abu Ala, Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority (September 2003-February 2006). Qurei, a long-time member of Fatah and numerous PLO bodies, formerly served as the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) from 1996-2003 and was one of the leading Palestinian negotiators in the secret talks that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. He has also served as the Minister of Economy and Trade and Minister of Industry in the PNA. Yasser Arafat appointed Qurei Prime Minister after the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas in September 2003. Qurei tenured his resignation due to internal security chaos in July 2004, but Arafat rejected the call. Qurei withdrew the resignation after gaining control of some security forces, but stepped down as Prime Minister after Hamas’ election victory in February 2006. See Parsons, Nigel. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. New York & London: Routledge, 2005. See online “Ahmed Qurei.” Encyclopedia of the Orient. 18 October 2007 http://lexicorient.com/e.o/qurei_a.htm

al-Rantisi, Dr. Abdel Aziz (1947-2004) Rantisi was one of the leading figures in Hamas during the first intifada, and the co-founder of the organization along with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. He was detained numerous times by Israeli security forces, before being expelled to Lebanon. He returned to PA administered territories after the Oslo process began in the 1990s, and by 1999 was the effective political head of Hamas. He was appointed as the leader of Hamas after Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was assassinated by an Israeli missile strike in March of 2004. Rantisi was a fierce proponent of suicide bombings against Israel, and frequently called for the destruction of the State of Israel. He was assassinated by Israel in April 2004. See Hartley, Cathy, ed. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, 2nd ed. London and New York: Europa Publications, 2004.

Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed (1938-2004), co-founder and spiritual leader of HAMAS, an organization and movement that seeks the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state in pre-1948 Palestine and advocates the destruction of Israel. Yassin was paralyzed and left partially blind due to a childhood accident. As a refugee in Gaza after 1948, he worked as a teacher, preacher, and community leader. He spent many years in Israeli prison, first for being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and later for ordering the killing of Palestinians accused of collaborating with the Israeli army. He was released in 1997 in exchange for the return of two Israeli secret service agents who had been detained in Jordan. The Israeli military attempted to assassinate him on several occasions, maintaining that he masterminded suicide attacks on Israelis. Sheikh Yassin opposed the Oslo process and preached a vehemently anti-Israel stance, making frequent public statements in support of suicide bombings. Prior to his death, he proposed a ceasefire with Israel on condition that they withdraw to 1967 boundaries and cease their policy of targeted assassinations. The Israeli military killed him by air strike on March 22, 2004. See Hartley, Cathy, ed. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, 2nd ed. London and New York: Europa Publications, 2004.

Interview with Majed Tbeile was conducted in March of 2004. Yasser Arrafat died on November 11, 2004 in Percy military hospital in Paris.

Targeted Assassinations While the State of Israel has increased its use of targeted assassinations of “wanted” men in the Occupied Palestinian Territories during the second intifada (218 individuals were killed in this manner in the Occupied Palestinian Territories between 2000-2007), Israeli security forces have employed the tactic for over thirty years. The most infamous series of Israel’s targeted assassinations abroad took place following the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Summer Olympics. More recently and more locally, leaders of Palestinian militant organizations were killed by targeted assassination, including the two previous heads of Hamas. Palestinian militant groups have also used targeted assassinations, although far less frequently. The highest profile extrajudicial killing by a Palestinian group was executed by the PFLP against Israel’s Tourism Minister in October 2001. The tactic is criticized both locally and internationally for the level of civilian casualties it can produce and also for the lack of due process in bringing the accused to justice. Proponents often argue that it is a tactic to prevent or deter further violence. See “Statistics.” B’Tselem. 10 November 2007 http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Casualties_Data.asp?Category=19 and Stein, Yael. “Position Paper: Israel’s Assassination Policy: Extra-judicial Executions.” January 2001. B’Tselem. 10 November 2007 http://www.btselem.org/english/publications/Index.asp?TF=10

Tbeileh is referring to the notion that the United States government during the Bush administration has not sufficiently condemned the Israeli government's policy of 'targeted assassinations' by the Sharon government.

Sharon, Ariel (1928-) Prime Minister of Israel, March 2001-January 2006. Member of the Likud Party and later founder of the Kadima Party. Israeli Minister of Defense during the Lebanon War from 1981 to 1983, when he resigned after a government commission found him indirectly responsible for the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Lebanese Christian Phalangist militias. Other positions held by Ariel Sharon include: Minister of Agriculture from 1977-1981, Minister of Trade and Industry from 1984-1990, and Foreign Minister from 1998-1999. Sharon held the position of Minister of Construction and Housing from 1990-1992, which witnessed the most comprehensive expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza since Israel’s occupation of the territories in 1967. While Sharon was referred to by many as the “father of the settlement movement”, he initiated and oversaw the withdrawal of all Israeli settlers from the Gaza strip in the summer of 2005. In November 2005, Sharon, while still serving as Israel’s Prime Minister, quit the Likud Party and formed a new centrist party named Kadima (meaning “forward” in English.) In justifying his exit from the party he helped found, Sharon stated that the Likud Party was no longer equipped to lead Israel nor oversee any future peace deals with the Palestinians. In early January 2006 Sharon suffered a massive stroke, underwent several operations, and is currently in a coma. Following Sharon’s admission to the hospital, powers of the Israeli Prime Minister were transferred to Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. See Hartley, Cathy, ed. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, 2nd ed. London and New York: Europa Publications, 2004. See online “Profile of Ariel Sharon.” 28 May 2006. BBC News Online. 9 November 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1154622.stm.

Mofaz, Shaul Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transportation and Road Safety, member of the ruling Kadima party. He was the Israeli minister of defense [at the time of this interview] before the appointment of Amir Peretz to the position in 2006. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/2/Shaul%20Mofaz

HAMAS (Arabic for “zeal” and an acronym for “Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya” or “Islamic Resistance Movement”). Inspired ideologically and organizationally by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and founded in 1987 at the beginning of the first intifada, HAMAS’ long-term and declared aim is the destruction of the State of Israel in order to establish an Islamic state in all of the land of British mandatory Palestine. It is the largest Palestinian militant Islamist group. It uses political, social and militant means to further its goals, and claims responsibility for militant operations, including the use of suicide bombings that have killed hundreds of Israeli soldiers and civilians. The European Union and Israeli and American governments consider HAMAS to be a terrorist organization. Its followers view HAMAS as a legitimate force fighting against Israel’s occupation over Palestinian territories. HAMAS also provides charitable social and educational services, primarily in Gaza. It runs candidates in municipal elections and closed elections for university councils, trade union groups and nongovernmental organizations. The Israeli military has assassinated many of its political and military leaders in the last few years, including the spiritual leader and founder Sheikh Ahmad Isma’il Yassin and political/military leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi. HAMAS’ success in recent Palestinian local elections (January 2005), and its dramatic rise to power in parliamentary elections in January 2006 has led some to speculate that the group is transforming from a primarily militant organization seeking an Islamic state over all of the land of British mandated Palestine to a political party focused on political control in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Fatah refused to accept the results of the 2006 elections, causing tensions between the two groups. In July 2007, HAMAS wrested control over all of the Gaza Strip from its main rival, Fatah. Soon after, PA President Mahmoud Abbas dismantled the newly formed unity government that included members of both Fatah and HAMAS, effectively ending HAMAS’ official role in the Palestinian Authority government. See Chehab, Zaki. Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement. New York: Avalon, 2007 and Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2006. See online “Backgrounder: Hamas.” 2007. Council on Foreign Relations. 29 August 2007 http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/#6

Jenin Palestinian city in the northern West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Est. population 35,000.

International media attention to the Israeli incursion/invasion of Jenin in March/April 2002 was extensive. Allegations of a massacre in Jenin spread quickly throughout the international media, with casualty estimates in the first days approaching the hundreds. According to a report prepared by the United Nations Secretary-General, approximately 70-80 Palestinians were killed during the incursion into Nablus and 52 Palestinians will killed during the incursion into Jenin. For a detailed account of the damage and deaths incurred in Nablus see the UN Secretary-General's Report at http://www.un.org/peace/jenin/index.html.

Refers to Jenin invasion/incursion of March/April 2002. Israeli forces re-occupied Jenin and attacked the Jenin refugee camp in "Operation Defensive Shield" in April 2002. At the time, the city was designated in Area A, the zone of the Occupied Territories held by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as part of the Oslo Peace Process. The Israeli military justified the invasion as a defensive measure against suspected militants in the camp, a response to six suicide bombings inside Israel in the two prior weeks that claimed 56 lives and injured hundreds. Allegations of a massacre in Jenin spread quickly throughout the international media, with casualty estimates in the first days approaching the hundreds. The accepted death toll was later settled and corrected by international investigations and the PNA at 56 Palestinians and 33 Israeli soldiers. While the death toll proved much lower than initial estimates, many sources, including Amnesty International, claim that "civilians, including children, were killed; humanitarian assistance was blocked and the wounded were denied medical assistance. Extensive demolition of houses rendered three thousand people, the majority children, homeless." See Amnesty International

Tbeileh is referring to the stigma in Palestinian society against "normalization," the process of creating "normal" relations between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors. Egypt was the first to normalize relations in 1979, with Jordan following in 1994. Normalization prior to the creation of a Palestinian state is viewed by many Palestinians and their supporters as a betrayal of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Normalization during the era of pan-Arabism was also regarded as a betrayal of a broader anti-colonial stance. The Saudi initiative was the most comprehensive offer of normalization by the Arab world, under the condition of Palestinian statehood.

Tulkarm A city in the Northwest of the West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, population approximately 45,000, the vast majority of whom are Palestinians. The total population of the Tulkarm district is 170,000.

Checkpoints Roadblocks or military installations used by security forces to control and restrict pedestrian movement and vehicle traffic. The Israeli army makes widespread use of checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in order to control the movement of Palestinians between Palestinian cities and villages and between the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel. Checkpoints can be large and semi-permanent structures resembling simple basic border crossings (such as the Kalandia checkpoint between Ramallah and Jerusalem or the Hawara checkpoint between Nablus and Ramallah) or small, temporary barriers on roadways or outside towns or villages. The security forces at a checkpoint exercise total control over movement through the checkpoint. Depending upon the location of the checkpoint, soldiers may and often do check the identity papers of every vehicle passenger and/or pedestrian who wishes to pass through. At certain checkpoints, mostly those that delineate Areas A, B and C, soldiers refuse passage to all who have not obtained permits from the Israeli military’s Civil Administration in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Palestinians and Israeli observers cite frequent, if not routine, incidences of delay and harassment of Palestinian civilians at checkpoints, regardless of the status of their papers. There are currently checkpoints at the entry and exit points of every large Palestinian populated area in the West Bank, on every major road within the West Bank, and at every crossing point on the Green Line between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in addition to many smaller checkpoints within the West Bank. According to the Israeli Army, a checkpoint is a “security mechanism to prevent the passage of terrorists from PA territory into Israel while maintaining both Israeli and Palestinian daily routine,” used to “facilitate rapid passage of Palestinians while providing maximal secu